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INTRODUCTION

The Great Recession and its aftermath deeply scarred the United
States. While estimates vary, approximately 9.3 million U.S. families
lost their homes to foreclosure or short sales.1 In the aftermath of the
1.
See Jonathan Horn, Foreclosed? Maybe You Can Buy Again, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB. (June 5, 2015, 9:41 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/jun/05/fore
closure-shortsale-boomerang-buyers-real-estate/; Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to
Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t Return—NAR, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:50
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/many-who-lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decade-wontreturn-nar-1429548640; see also Annamaria Andriotis et al., After Foreclosures, Home
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financial collapse, nearly $11 trillion in household wealth vanished.2
Years after the crisis, about 7.5 million families still owe more on their
mortgage loans than the current value of their homes.3 Approximately
7.9 million U.S. jobs disappeared,4 and the seasonally adjusted mean
duration of unemployment nearly doubled the peak duration in prior
modern economic downturns.5 These macroeconomic trends rippled
out to profoundly damage the lives of millions of Americans. The
number of homeless families nationwide increased by 4% from 2008
to 2009.6 Neighborhoods stricken by foreclosures faced significant
increases in crime.7 Reflecting growing financial uncertainty and
stress, sociologists found that the Great Recession was strongly
associated with significant increases (a sixfold increase by one
measure) in the likelihood that children would fall victim to physical
abuse.8
Epidemiologists and economists have discovered an
association between home mortgage foreclosure and significant
increases in sickness, including heart attack, stroke, respiratory failure,
gastrointestinal hemorrhage, and kidney failure.9 Studies suggest that
Buyers Are Back, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 8, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
after-foreclosures-home-buyers-are-back-1428538655 (providing alternative estimates); Tara
Siegel Bernard, Years After the Market Collapse, Sidelined Borrowers Return, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/your-money/a-second-try-at-homebuying-after-the-market-collapse.html (same).
2.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xv
(2011).
See Michela Zonta & Sarah Edelman, The Uneven Housing Recovery, CTR. FOR
3.
AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/report/2015/
11/02/123537/the-uneven-housing-recovery/; 7.3 Million Boomerang Buyers Poised To
Recover Homeownership in Next 8 Years, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.realty
trac.com/news/foreclosure-trends/boomerang-buyers/.
4.
Chris Isidore, 7.9 Million Jobs Lost, Many Forever, CNNMONEY (July 2, 2010,
11:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/02/news/economy/jobs_gone_forever/.
5.
Henry S. Farber, Job Loss in the Great Recession and Its Aftermath: U.S.
Evidence from the Displaced Workers Survey 3-4 (Nat’1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 21,216, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21216.pdf (“A related concern is the
unprecedentedly long average duration of unemployment spells. . . .
The mean
unemployment rate reached about 20 weeks in the three earlier recessions . . . but rose to 37
weeks in the Great Recession.”).
6.
M. William Sermons & Peter Witte, State of Homelessness in America, NAT’L
ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS 1 (Jan. 2011), http://www.endhomelessness.org/page//files/The_State_of_Homelessness_in_America_2011.pdf.
7.
Lin Cui & Randall Walsh, Foreclosure, Vacancy and Crime, 87 J. URB. ECON. 72,
80 (2015); Ryan M. Goodstein & Yan Y. Lee, Do Foreclosures Increase Crime? 3 (FDIC Ctr.
for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2010-05, 2010).
See, e.g., Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., The Great Recession and the Risk for Child
8.
Maltreatment, 37 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 721, 725 (2013).
9.
Ana V. Diez Roux, Editorial, The Foreclosure Crisis and Cardiovascular Disease,
129 CIRCULATION 2248, 2248-49 (2014); see also Mariana Arcaya et al., Effects of Proximate

Foreclosed Properties on Individuals’ Systolic Blood Pressure in Massachusetts, 1987 to
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the foreclosure crisis was partially responsible for a 13% increase in
the national suicide rate10 and a 35% increase in the number of
households facing food insecurity.11 The causes and consequences of
the Great Recession are undeniably complex. And although there are
as many honorable and well-meaning people and companies in the
consumer finance industry, there can be no serious debate that
consumer financial services gone awry can intensely harm American
families.
In the wake of this financial catastrophe, the public demanded,
and the United States Congress delivered, the most transformative
financial reform since the 1930s. While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act12 (Dodd-Frank) included many
changes, its centerpiece was the creation of the new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau).13 The brainchild of the
charismatic Harvard Law professor Elizabeth Warren,14 the newest
federal agency describes itself as a “21st century agency that helps
consumer finance markets work by making rules more effective, by
2008, 129 CIRCULATION 2262, 2266 (2014) (“The presence of real estate-owned foreclosed
properties near participants’ homes predicted higher measured systolic blood pressure in a
large cohort.”); Carolyn C. Cannuscio et al., Housing Strain, Mortgage Foreclosure, and
Health, 60 NURSING OUTLOOK 134 (2012) (finding that foreclosure has an adverse effect on
mental health); Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Is There a Link Between Foreclosure and
Health?, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Feb. 2015, at 63, 76-77 (finding statistically significant
correlations between foreclosure and nonelective hospital visits for a variety of serious
conditions).
10. Jason N. Houle & Michael T. Light, The Home Foreclosure Crisis and Rising
Suicide Rates, 2005 to 2010, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1073, 1073 (2014).
11. Patricia M. Anderson et al., Food Insecurity and the Great Recession: The Role
of Unemployment Duration, Credit and Housing Markets 1 (June 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Texas A&M University); see also Deborah A. Frank et al., Heat or

Eat: The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program and Nutritional and Health Risks
Among Children Less Than 3 Years of Age, 118 PEDIATRICS e1293 (2006), http://pediatrics.
aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/118/5/e1293.full.pdf (evaluating the “association
between a family's participation or nonparticipation in the Low Income Home Energy
Assistance Program and the anthropometric status and health of their young children”); T.
Jelleyman & N. Spencer, Research Report, Residential Mobility in Childhood and Health
Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 62 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 584 (2008)
(describing the harmful effects of residential mobility on pediatric health); Margot B. Kushel
et al., Housing Instability and Food Insecurity as Barriers to Health Care Among LowIncome Americans, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 71 (2006) (showing the harmful effects of
food insecurity on health).
12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, 42
U.S.C. (2012)).
13. See id. tit. X, 124 Stat. at 1955-2113.
14. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. (Summer 2007),
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/.
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consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, and by empowering
consumers to take more control over their economic lives.”15 The
agency further describes its “core functions” thus:
We work to give consumers the information they need to understand the
terms of their agreements with financial companies. We are working to
make regulations and guidance as clear and streamlined as possible so
providers of consumer financial products and services can follow the
rules on their own.
Congress established the CFPB to protect consumers by carrying out
federal consumer financial laws. Among other things, we:
• Write rules, supervise companies, and enforce federal consumer
financial protection laws
• Restrict unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices
• Take consumer complaints
• Promote financial education
• Research consumer behavior
• Monitor financial markets for new risks to consumers
• Enforce laws that outlaw discrimination and other unfair treatment in
16
consumer finance.

Despite the agency’s seemingly benign mission statement and
purpose, it has faced dogged, and at times vitriolic, opposition from
some in the financial industry. Some political leaders with close ties to
the banking and consumer finance industry have argued that the CFPB
(1) is a “runaway agency,”17
(2) is an example of “how socialism starts” and “a vast
bureaucracy with no congressional oversight,”18
(3) is a “rogue agency that dishes out malicious financial
policy,”19
15. The Bureau, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited
Apr. 4, 2016) (“[T]his means ensuring that consumers get the information they need to make
the financial decisions they believe are best for themselves and their families—that prices are
clear up front, that risks are visible, and that nothing is buried in fine print. In a market that
works, consumers should be able to make direct comparisons among products and no
provider should be able to use unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.”).
16. Id.; see also Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1160-75 (2012) (providing case study examples of the Bureau’s
approach to its core functions).
17. Michael Hiltzik, Consumer Protection: Why Do Republicans Hate the CFPB So
Much?, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2015, 12:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fimh-cfpb-republicans-20150723-column.html (quoting Senator Ted Cruz).
18. Louis Jacobson, Carly Fiorina Says Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Has
‘No Congressional Oversight,’ POLITIFACT (Nov. 14, 2015, 8:33 PM), http://www.politifact.
com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/nov/14/carly-fiorina/carly-fiorina-says-consumer-financialprotection-b/ (quoting Carly Fiorina).
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(4) takes actions that are “misguided and deceptive,”20
(5) “continually oversteps its bounds,”21
(6) has aspects similar to “the Stalin model,”22 and
(7) is a “nanny state mechanism.”23
These claims have in turn provided rhetorical support for dozens of
congressional bills aiming to eliminate, defund, or weaken the agency
in some procedural or substantive respect.24
19. Ben Lane, U.S. Senator: CFPB Is Rogue Agency Dishing Out Malicious
Financial Policy, HOUSINGWIRE (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/
33322-us-senator-cfpb-is-a-rogue-agency-that-dishes-out-malicious-financial-policy (quoting
Senator David Perdue).
20. REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 114TH CONG., UNSAFE AT ANY
BUREAUCRACY: CFPB JUNK SCIENCE AND INDIRECT AUTO LENDING (2015).
21. John Ratcliffe, Abolishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, WASH.
TIMES (July 30, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/30/john-ratcliffeabolishing-the-consumer-financial-p/.
22. Jim Lardner, The Real Wolves of Wall Street, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 6,
2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/10/06/thegops-obstructive-consumer-protection-play (quoting Representative Sean Duffy).
23. Ben S. Carson, The Perfect Example of Government Overreach: The CFPB,
WASH. TIMES (July 28, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/28/bencarson-perfect-example-government-overreach/.
24. At the end of 2015, at least forty-eight bills were pending before Congress that
sought to change the CFPB. These bills include the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection Advisory Boards Act, H.R. 1195, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the creation of a
Small Business Advisory Board “to advise and consult with the Bureau in the exercise of the
Bureau’s functions under the Federal consumer financial laws applicable to eligible financial
products or services” and “to provide information on emerging practices of small business
concerns that provide eligible financial products or services, including regional trends,
concerns, and other relevant information,” along with various requirements regarding board
member qualifications and meeting frequency and limits on the amount of funding that the
CFPB Director could request in future years); SAFE Act Confidentiality and Privilege
Enhancement Act, H.R. 1480, 114th Cong. (2015) (amending the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, div. A, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2654,
2810-30, to allow federal and state officials to access any information that comes from any
program or system run by the CFPB); Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 1261, 114th Cong. (2015) (prohibiting the CFPB from
receiving funding from transfers of earnings from the Federal Reserve); Consumer Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 1262, 114th Cong. (2015) (prohibiting the CFPB from
disclosing a consumer’s personal information unless “the Bureau clearly and conspicuously
discloses to the consumer, in writing or in an electronic form, what information will be
requested, obtained, accessed, collected, used, retained, or disclosed” and “before such
information is requested, obtained, accessed, collected, used, retained, or disclosed, the
consumer informs the Bureau that such information may be requested, obtained, accessed,
collected, used, retained, or disclosed”); Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness
Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 1263, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the Financial Stability
Oversight Council to set aside CFPB final regulations if it was determined that the
regulations were “inconsistent with the safe and sound operations of United States financial
institutions”); Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2015, H.R. 1266, 114th Cong.
(2015) (replacing the CFPB with a “Financial Product Safety Commission”); Reforming
CFPB Indirect Auto Financing Guidance Act, H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. (2015) (creating
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A complete discussion of the merit of these claims or the pending
legislation they purport to justify is well beyond the scope of this
Article. Instead, this study evaluates the actual track record of the
CFPB in one important respect: the congressional directive that the
agency enforce the nation’s consumer financial protection laws.25
Today, the CFPB’s Division of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair
Lending (SEFL) has been open for business for over four years. The
public has a right to expect that the CFPB has created an agency that
will protect Americans from the all-too-real financial, mental health,
and physical harms associated with illegal consumer financial
practices. To this end, this study gathers quantitative and qualitative
information in hopes of providing an answer to a simple, but critically
important, question: Has the United States succeeded in creating an
effective consumer financial civil law enforcement agency?
This Article presents the first empirical analysis of all publicly
announced CFPB enforcement actions. Part II provides a background
discussion summarizing the CFPB’s enforcement authority,
jurisdiction, and powers. Part III explains the study’s simple,
descriptive methodology. Part IV reports results. Part V sets out seven
noteworthy findings, and Part VI briefly concludes. To assist policy
requirements for the CFPB to follow when issuing guidance regarding indirect auto
financing, including public notice, consultation with other federal agencies, and studies on
the potential effects that the guidance might have on certain consumer groups); Right To
Lend Act of 2015, H.R. 1766, 114th Cong. (2015) (repealing section 704(b) of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25 (1974)—a statute
through which the CFPB collects information about small business loans); Financial
Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act, H.R. 1941, 114th Cong. (2015)
(furthering protection of various institutions and credit unions from any potential retaliation
by the CFPB); H.R. 2099, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the CFPB “to develop a model form
for a disclosure notice that shall be used by depository institutions and credit unions”);
Financial Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 2477, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the CFPB to
adopt new data-reporting standards); Community Financial Institution Exemption Act, H.R.
3048, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the CFPB to exempt “community financial institutions,”
or “insured depository institution[s] or credit union[s] with less than $10,000,000,000 in
consolidated assets,” from CFPB rules and regulations); Bureau Research Transparency Act,
H.R. 3131, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the CFPB “to include all studies, data, and other
analyses” upon which a published research paper was based); S. 96, 114th Cong. (2015)
(requiring the CFPB to disclose all of the information that the CFPB maintains about a
particular consumer upon request by a consumer); SAFE Act Confidentiality and Privilege
Enhancement Act, S. 372, 114th Cong. (2015) (allowing federal and state officials to have
access to any information that comes from any program or system run by the CFPB);
Financial Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act, S. 774, 114th Cong. (2015)
(changing the appeals process that the CFPB must follow to further protect various
institutions and credit unions from any potential retaliation by the CFPB); and Repeal CFPB
Act, S. 1804, 114th Cong. (2015) (discontinuing the CFPB by repealing the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113).
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012).
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makers, courts, legal counsel, academics, and students studying the
CFPB’s enforcement work, an appendix identifying every publicly
announced CFPB enforcement action through 2015 follows.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE CFPB’S SUPERVISORY AND
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

U.S. federal consumer protection law is a jumble of statutes that
Congress adopted and frequently amended in fits and starts over nearly
fifty years. Each statute was the product of compromise, and many
were enacted in response to technological change or evolving
commercial patterns in the sometimes harsh U.S. financial services
industry. Among the most important of these statutes are the Truth in
Lending Act26 (TILA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act27 (ECOA), the
Fair Credit Reporting Act28 (FCRA), the Electronic Fund Transfer Act29
(EFTA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 197430
(RESPA), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act31 (FDCPA).
Congress has supplemented these core statutes with a variety of
amendatory or specifically focused acts that address problematic
practices in particular markets. These statutes include the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 199432 (HOEPA), the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act33 (ILSA), the Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 200934 (CARD
Act), the Military Lending Act35 (MLA), and the Secure and Fair

26. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. I).
27. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. IV).
28. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 1114, 1127-36
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. III).
29. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. IX, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728-41
(1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. VI).
30. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 27).
31. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. V).
32. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. I,
subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190-98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ch.
41).
33. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIV, 82 Stat.
476, 590-99 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 42).
34. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ch. 41).
35. Military Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266-69
(2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987).
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Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 200836 (SAFE Act). In
addition to each of these statutes, the Federal Trade Commission Act37
(FTCA) has for many decades declared unlawful any “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”38
Prior to the financial crisis, regulatory, supervisory, and
enforcement authority for each of these statues was distributed across a
variety of regulatory agencies. With some limited exceptions, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve)
generally held regulatory authority under these statutes.39 The Federal
Reserve also held supervisory and enforcement authority for these
statutes with respect to bank holding companies, state-chartered banks
that are members of the Federal Reserve System, nonbank subsidiaries
of bank holding companies, and foreign banking organizations
operating in the United States.40 For national banks that were not
members of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) within the United States Department of the
Treasury (Treasury) held supervisory and enforcement authority.41 The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) held supervisory and
enforcement authority for most of these statues with respect to statechartered banks.42 The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)
36. Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-289, div. A, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2654, 2810-30 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 51).
37. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. ch. 2).
38. Id. § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
39. Exceptions include the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, wherein Congress
originally did not give rulemaking authority to any federal agency, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and
the Military Lending Act, wherein Congress gave regulatory authority to the United States
Department of Defense, see 10 U.S.C. § 987.
40. FED. RESERVE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 59
(9th ed. 2005). The Federal Reserve also has jurisdiction over Edge Act Corporations,
through which U.S. banks conduct international banking activities, and nonbanking activities
of foreign banks. Id. Edge Act Corporations are bank subsidiaries set up to offer services
only to non-U.S. residents and institutions. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (2015) (describing
Regulation K); KAROL K. SPARKS & HARDING DE C. WILLIAMS, THE KEYS TO BANKING LAW:
A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 184 (2012).
41. See generally MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40249, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 4, 7 (2010)
(describing the OCC’s regulatory power over banks and its incorporation into the Treasury).
Prior to the financial crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) held supervisory and
enforcement authority over federally chartered thrifts. Title III of Dodd-Frank abolished the
OTS. See 12 U.S.C. § 5413. Dodd-Frank gave jurisdiction over savings and loan holding
companies to the Federal Reserve. See id. § 5412. The OCC received rulemaking and
supervisory authority over federal savings associations. Id. And Congress gave authority
over state-chartered savings associations to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). Id.
42. See JICKLING & MURPHY, supra note 41, at 4, 14.
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held supervisory and enforcement authority for these statutes for credit
unions.43 The United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) was the primary regulatory and enforcement
authority for RESPA.44 Financial companies other than banks and
credit unions were not supervised by the federal government, but were
subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement actions
under most of these consumer protection statutes.45 The Federal
Reserve, the OCC, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the FDIC,
and the FTC each had authority to enforce the general prohibition of
unfair or deceptive acts or practices against companies subject to their
jurisdiction.46
Consumer advocates and academics argued that the structure of
federal consumer financial regulation had several structural flaws. The
split responsibility for rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement
across multiple different agencies with respect to interrelated statutes
made timely reform and consistent interpretation difficult. Many
argued that prudential regulators tasked with both promoting safety
and soundness as well as consumer protection compliance neglected
the latter.47 Throughout the boom years of subprime and exotic
mortgage lending prior to the 2008 crash, federal banking regulators
often worked closely with the financial industry to preempt more
aggressive state and local consumer protection regulations.48 The
Federal Reserve declined to aggressively exercise its considerable
discretion under HOEPA to address the emerging glut of unaffordable

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 4, 18.
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act § 2(a), 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a).

See JICKLING & MURPHY, supra note 41, at 4-5.

12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1), (e)(1), (i)(2); FDIC & Fed. Reserve, Financial Institution
Letters: Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices by State-Chartered Banks, FDIC 1 (Mar. 11,
2004), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2004/fil2604.html; OCC Advisory Letter:
Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, OCC (Mar. 22, 2002), http://www.occ.
gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2002/advisory-letter-2002-3.pdf.
47. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets
Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 155-56 (2009); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of
Central Banks in Bank Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003); cf. Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between
Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 93, 122 (2009)
(arguing that effective safety and soundness regulation must include consumer protection).
48. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at 13; Christopher L. Peterson,

Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal
Regulators Biting Off More than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 547-49 (2007);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and
Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004).
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mortgage loans.49 Consumer finance businesses had considerable
incentive to shop for the banking charter and regulator that provided
the least searching oversight.50 HUD interpreted RESPA’s prohibition
of kickbacks in a way that made it difficult for borrowers to legally
challenge mortgage brokers that accepted “yield spread premium”
compensation in exchange for convincing their clients to take on
unaffordable, exotic mortgage loans.51 The FTC, which lacks jurisdiction over any bank or credit union, generally was unable to exert
sufficient deterrence to head off the impending catastrophe.52 And the
lack of supervisory oversight allowed nonbank financial companies
more latitude in skirting the law.
In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress adopted DoddFrank.53 Among a variety of reforms, Title X of Dodd-Frank, called
the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 201054 (CFPA), created the
new CFPB. Drawing on the proposals of Warren, Oren Bar-Gill, Heidi
Mandanis Schooner, and Treasury reports,55 the CFPA created the first
49. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at 19-22; KATHLEEN C. ENGEL &
PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND
NEXT STEPS 194-96 (2011); see Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 34 (2012); see also 15
U.S.C. § 57a (authorizing the FTC to issue rules, policy statements, and definitions with
respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce).
50. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at xviii.
51. See Taiesha L. Cantwell, Yield-Spread Premiums: Who’s Working for the
Borrower? HUD’s Erroneous Regulation and Its Bar on Plaintiffs, 21 LAW & INEQ. 367, 38890 (2003) (arguing that a legally permissible construction of RESPA’s kickback prohibition
should not have precluded class actions based on rate-sheet pricing common to all
borrowers). Compare 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (prohibiting kickbacks in residential mortgage
loan settlement), with Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1:
Clarification of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage
Brokers, and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 53,052,
53,053 (Oct. 18, 2001) (adopting a total-compensation test that permitted lender payment of
fees to mortgage brokers in exchange for originating more expensive loans than borrowers
qualified for under the lender’s own underwriting guidelines).
52. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at 76.
53. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
54. See id. tit. X, 124 Stat. at 1955-2113.
55. See Warren, supra note 14 (“[A] Financial Product Safety Commission could
eliminate some of the most egregious tricks and traps in the credit industry.”); Oren Bar-Gill
& Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 99 (2008) (calling for a new
consumer financial administrative agency with “broad rulemaking and enforcement authority
over consumer credit products [that would] eliminate regulatory gaps and contradictions . . .
and . . . halt the state and federal regulatory competition that undercuts consumer safety”);
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in
Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 83 (2005) (“True reform of consumer
protection laws can only be achieved through an effective mechanism for implementation and
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federal agency charged with an exclusive focus on consumer financial
protection.56 The CFPA transferred regulatory authority for “consumer
financial law” to the CFPB;57 it defined “consumer financial law” to
include the CFPA itself along with eighteen “enumerated” consumer
laws, including nearly all consumer credit and bank-account-related
consumer protection statutes.58
enforcement. Giving the job of consumer protection to a consumer protection agency seems
the most logical choice. Asking bank regulators to do the job of a consumer protection
agency not only poses conflicts of interest and creates inefficiencies, but could also distract
bank regulators from their mandate: to protect the solvency of banks.”); Financial Regulatory
Reform: A New Foundation, TREASURY 55 (June 17, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (“[W]e propose the creation of a single
regulatory agency, a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), with the authority and
accountability to make sure that consumer protection regulations are written fairly and
enforced vigorously.”); Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, TREASURY
14 (Mar. 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.
pdf (advocating for a “Conduct of Business Regulatory Agency” that “would be responsible
for business conduct regulation, including consumer protection issues, across all types of
firms, including the three types of federally chartered institutions”).
56. See Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 § 1021(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a).
57. See id. There are at least two notable exceptions to the Bureau’s rulemaking
authority. First, in addition to the enumerated laws, Congress separately gave the CFPB,
along with prudential regulators and the FTC, enforcement authority over the MLA in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 661(a)-(b),
662(a)-(b), 663, 126 Stat. 1632, 1785-86 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987(d)(2),
(f)(5)-(6), (h)(3), (i)(2)). However, the Department of Defense retains rulemaking authority,
subject to a consultation requirement with the CFPB, the Treasury, the prudential regulators,
and the FTC. Second, the Federal Reserve retained rulemaking authority over enumerated
consumer laws as applied to automobile dealers that do not routinely engage in “buy here,
pay here” financing. See 12 U.S.C. § 5519.
58. The enumerated consumer laws include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit.
VIII, 96 Stat. 1469, 1545-48 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 39);
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. I, pt. E);
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. IX, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728-41
(1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. VI);
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. IV);
Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. III, 88 Stat. 1500, 1511-17 (1974)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. I, pt. D);
Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 1114, 1127-36
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. III) (excluding sections
615(e) and 628, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e) and 1681w);
Homeowners Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-216, 112 Stat. 897
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 49);
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. V);
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 151, 105 Stat. 2236, 2282-85 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831t(c)-(f ) );
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In addition to the creation of the CFPB, Dodd-Frank also
included some substantive consumer financial law reform. Most
notably, Title XIV of Dodd-Frank included an array of changes to
address predatory mortgage lending, including an ability-to-repay
standard and a prohibition of loan originator compensation tied to
terms other than the size of a loan.59 Dodd-Frank also amended EFTA
to require more informative and accurate disclosures on remittance
money transfers.60 And most controversially, Dodd-Frank also added a
new general standard of “abusive practices” to the older deception and
unfairness standards.61 Spelling out several different abusiveness
criteria, the CFPA defines “abusive behavior” as an act or practice that
(1)
(2)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
takes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 502-509, 113 Stat. 1338,
1437-45 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6802-6809) (excluding
section 505 as it applies to section 501(b));
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, tit. III, 89 Stat.
1124, 1125-28 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 29);
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. I,
subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190-98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C. ch. 41);
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 27);
Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-289, div. A, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2654, 2810-30 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
ch. 51);
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. I);
Truth in Savings Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, tit. II, subtit. F, 105 Stat. 2236, 233443 (1991) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 44);
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-8, § 626(a)-(b), 123 Stat. 524, 678-79 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5538); and
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIV, 82 Stat.
476, 590-99 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 42).

Also, Congress later gave the CFPB enforcement authority under the Military Lending Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266-69 (2006) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 987). However, the Department of Defense retains rulemaking authority for this
statute. 10 U.S.C. § 987(h).
59. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1403, 15
U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1); id. § 1411, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1).
60. See id. § 1073(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1.
61. See id. § 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
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the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial
product or service; or
the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered
62
person to act in the interests of the consumer.

The abusiveness standard has alternatively been the subject of
much hand wringing in the financial services industry and excitement
amongst consumer advocates. Some have argued that the standard has
the potential to tap the growing body of behavioral economic analysis
of consumer contracts to prevent harmful practices not effectively
addressed by the deceptive-and-unfair-practices prohibition of the
FTCA and related laws.63 In contrast, some financial services industry
lawyers have worried that, without further clarification, the standard is
“infinitely flexible” and therefore meaningless.64 Similarly, Todd
Zywicki has argued that that the standard is “dangerous” because it
“will likely chill innovation,” especially in light of the CFPB’s
“tendency toward overuse of enforcement.”65

62.
63.

Id.
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection,

7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 107 (2012) (arguing that because the Bureau’s antiabuse authority is “based mostly on the substance of deals rather than disclosure, [it] is
arguably the most exciting development in consumer protection since the advent of the
modern consumer movement in the 1960s”); Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The DoddFrank and Consumer Financial Protection Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM.
L. 118, 119 (2011) (arguing that under the abusiveness standard, “the Bureau is empowered
to take any authorized action, including rulemaking”); Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in
Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405,
413 (2013) (noting that the abusiveness standard “provides the CFPB with a unique and
flexible authority to deal with abuses in the consumer financial services sector and to issue
rules or initiate enforcement actions to address the exploitation of certain consumer
behavioral biases by financial service providers”); Carey Alexander, Note, Abusive: DoddFrank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle To Protect Consumers, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1105, 1144-45 (2011) (arguing that the Bureau’s “expansive power to address abusive
practices . . . potentially represents the rising of a new dawn in consumer protection”).
64. See, e.g., Eric Mogilnicki & Eamonn K. Moran, The CFPB’s Enforcement of the
Prohibition on Abusive Acts and Practices, 104 Banking Rep. (BNA) 236, 244 (Feb. 3, 2015)
(“[W]e note the risk that the Bureau will continue to resist further defining the ‘abusive’
standard. This approach would be a missed opportunity, as an infinitely flexible standard
provides no guidance to covered persons and no permanent protection to consumers.”); see
also Reginald R. Goeke, Is the CFPB Torturing Language with Its Abusive Standard?,
LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/621386/is-the-cfpbtorturing-language-with-its-abusive-standard (“This ‘I know it when I see it’ approach
naturally grants the CFPB the maximum flexibility to bring enforcement actions, while
granting industry participants the minimum level of notice about what is required of them.”).
65. Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 922-23 (2013).
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Generally speaking, the CFPA applies to “covered persons,”
which is defined as “any person that engages in offering or providing a
consumer financial product or service.”66 At least with respect to
nonbanks, the CFPA treats “any director, officer, or employee charged
with managerial responsibility” as a “related person,” which is
“deemed to mean a covered person for all purposes.”67 Beyond the
CFPA’s general applicability, the CFPB’s authorities are tailored to fit
each of the Bureau’s three primary legal tools.68
First, and most broadly, the CFPB generally has rulemaking
authority under consumer financial laws, including the prohibition of
unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices.69 Second, the Bureau
has supervisory jurisdiction over all banks and credit unions with over
$10 billion in assets.70 The Bureau also has supervisory jurisdiction
over all nonbank mortgage originators, brokers, servicers, and
foreclosure assistance providers; private student loan originators; and
payday lenders.71 The CFPB also may assert supervisory jurisdiction
over other large or especially risky nonbank covered persons by issuing
a regulation.72 To date, the Bureau has issued “larger participant” rules
creating supervisory jurisdiction over large consumer reporting
agencies,73 consumer debt collection businesses,74 student loan
servicers,75 international remittance providers,76 and automobile
finance companies.77 Finally, the Bureau has enforcement jurisdiction
over any covered person or service provider to a covered person,
66. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)(A).
67. Id. § 5481(25)(B)-(C). The definition of “related person” excludes bank holding
companies, credit unions, and depository institutions. Id. § 5481(25)(A).
68. In addition to its legal tools, the Bureau also has important authorities and
responsibilities with respect to consumer education and engagement as well as consumercomplaint intake and referral. See, e.g., id. § 5534 (establishing consumer-complaint
response authorities and responsibilities); id. § 5493(b)(2) (requiring the establishment of an
office for providing information, guidance, and technical assistance on the provision of
financial services to traditionally underserved communities); id. § 5493(d) (establishing an
Office of Financial Education); id. § 5493(e) (establishing an Office of Service Member
Affairs); id. § 5493(g) (establishing an Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans);
id. § 5535 (requiring designation of a Private Education Loan Ombudsman).
69. Id. § 5512; 15 U.S.C. § 45.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 5515.
71. Id. § 5514(a).
72. Id.
73. See 12 C.F.R. § 1090.104 (2015).
74. See id. § 1090.105.
75. See id. § 1090.106.
76. See id. § 1090.107.
77. See Defining Larger Participants of the Automobile Financing Market and
Defining Certain Automobile Leasing Activity as a Financial Product or Service, 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,496 (June 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1090).
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except for small banks and credit unions and automobile dealers that
do not routinely engage in “buy here, pay here” financing.78 Other
businesses Congress also generally excluded from the scope of the
CFPB’s authority include persons regulated by the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, and state insurance regulators; real
estate brokers; accountants; and attorneys practicing law under certain
circumstances.79
Congress gave the CFPB’s Office of Enforcement the authority to
initiate federal investigations through serving subpoenas, issuing civil
investigative demands, or compelling testimony at investigative
hearings.80 The Bureau’s investigative powers extend not only to
covered persons, but also to anyone who Bureau investigators
reasonably believe has evidence relevant to an investigation.81 To set
limits upon and articulate expectations for Bureau investigations, the
CFPB published a regulation defining its rules relating to
investigations following a public notice-and-comment period.82
Congress authorized the Bureau to enforce federal consumer
financial laws either through administrative enforcement procedures83
or through its own authority to litigate in federal court.84 The former is
governed by the CFPB’s regulation defining the rules of practice for
adjudicative proceedings.85 This process is subject to the same rules of
administrative procedure that govern other federal agencies.86 The
rules provide for an adjudicative hearing on the Office of
Enforcement’s alleged violations of law before an administrative law
78. 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a), (c) (2012); id. § 5516(a), (d). Unless they are acting as a
service provider to a covered person, other businesses explicitly excluded from CFPB
enforcement authority include nonfinancial retailers of goods or services, real estate brokers,
manufactured home retailers, accountants or tax preparers, and, in some circumstances,
attorneys. Id. § 5517.
79. Id. §§ 5481(20)-(22); id. § 5517. But see CFPB v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs.,
P.C., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1362-70 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding that a debt collection “lawsuit
mill” was subject to CFPB jurisdiction under FDCPA and CFPA).
80. See 12 U.S.C. § 5562.
81. See id. § 5562(b)(1), (c)(1).
82. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1080.
83. See 12 U.S.C. § 5563.
84. See id. § 5564.
85. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1081.
86. See id. § 1081.104(a) (“No provision of this part shall be construed to limit the
powers of the hearing officers provided by the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”); id.
§ 1081.303(b)(1) (“Except as is otherwise set forth in this section, relevant, material, and
reliable evidence that is not unduly repetitive is admissible to the fullest extent authorized by
the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”).
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judge, called a “hearing officer.”87 Bureau administrative law judges
are housed within an independent judicial office within the CFPB
called the Office of Administrative Adjudication (OAA).88 OAA
decisions are reviewable on appeal by the Director of the CFPB.89
Alternatively, Congress has also authorized the Bureau’s Office of
Enforcement to commence civil litigation in federal courts.90 This
litigation authority is independent of the United States Department of
Justice and merely requires the Bureau to notify the United States
Attorney General when commencing a civil action.91
In either adjudicative proceedings or civil litigation, the CFPB is
entitled by law to seek any appropriate legal or equitable relief,
including rescission, refunds, restitution, disgorgement, damages,
public notification of violations, and limits on the activities of the
defendant.92 The Bureau can also seek to impose punitive civil money
penalties not to exceed $5,000 per day during which the violation
occurred, with the penalty increasing to up to $25,000 per day for
defendants engaged in reckless violations and up to $1 million per day
for knowing violations.93 In assessing civil money penalties, the
CFPB, or a court, is required to consider the size and financial
resources of the defendant, the gravity of the violation, the severity of
risks or losses imposed on consumers, the history of previous
violations, and other matters as justice requires.94
III. METHODS: CLASSIFYING THE CFPB OFFICE OF
ENFORCEMENT’S BODY OF WORK
This study is the first empirical analysis of all publicly announced
CFPB enforcement actions. Every public enforcement case from the
inception of the Bureau through the end of the 2015 calendar year was
identified and classified. CFPB enforcement actions can begin either
as Office of Enforcement investigations or as supervisory exams. This
study does not include supervisory matters that were resolved
confidentially. On the other hand, where a supervisory exam led to a
publicly announced enforcement action, the matter was included.
Cases were identified through reviewing the Bureau’s press releases,
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. § 1081.103.
Id.
Id. §§ 1081.104, .302, .402.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a) (2012).
Id. § 5564(d).
Id. § 5565(a)(2).
Id. § 5565(c)(2).
Id. § 5565(c)(3).
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annual reports to Congress, and administrative adjudication docket, as
well as searching the Bureau’s unsealed federal court pleadings. CFPB
press releases are widely available to anyone who registers with an
email address for the Bureau’s press release distribution list and can
also be retrieved through a search of the Bureau’s web page.
Administrative cases were identified through the matter list and docket
sheets maintained by the Bureau’s OAA. The OAA’s matter list
includes every case initiated by the Office of Enforcement through its
administrative enforcement procedures.95
For every publicly announced case, the CFPB has released some
legal documentation of the enforcement matter.96 Typically, these
documents include one or more of the following: a complaint, a notice
of charges, a consent order, a stipulation consenting to the issuance of
a consent order, or a settlement agreement.97 In addition, the Bureau
ordinarily issues a press release, which is accompanied sometimes by a
frequently-asked-questions document or another source of information
for consumers who may be affected by the enforcement matter. For
cases pursued through the CFPB’s administrative enforcement
procedures, the OAA maintains a docket sheet that includes all
publicly available pleadings, motions, and orders.98 For cases in
litigation, court filings were accessed as necessary through the publicly
available PACER system provided by the U.S. judiciary.
For each of the CFPB’s cases, these documents were reviewed
and coded using over 70 different variables. Coded variables included
the date the Bureau announced each case; the date the case was
resolved (if any); whether the case was filed as an administrative
enforcement matter with the OAA or as litigation in U.S. district court;
whether the Bureau proceeded in partnership with some other law
enforcement agency; whether the case was settled or contested upon
announcement; whether the case involved a bank, credit union, or
some other nondepository company; and whether the Bureau charged
an individual defendant with violating the law.
Moreover, this study classifies every violation of law that the
CFPB has asserted in public enforcement actions based on the statute
95. See Enforcement Actions, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited May 9, 2016).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., PHH Corporation, PHH Mortgage Corporation, PHH Home Loans,
LLC, Atrium Insurance Corporation, and Atrium Reinsurance Corporation, CFPB,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/phh-corporation/
(last updated July 31, 2015).
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providing the legal authority for the claim. These classifications
include all 18 enumerated statues set out in the CFPA; additional law
that Congress subsequently added to the Bureau’s enforcement
jurisdiction; and the Bureau’s unfairness, deception, and abusive-actsor-practices (UDAAP) authority.99 UDAAP-related claims were
further classified based on whether the Bureau alleged a violation of a
deception- or unfairness-based regulation predating Dodd-Frank or the
CFPA’s general statutory UDAAP prohibition. Coded violations of
deception- and unfairness-based regulations included the FTC’s
Telemarketing Sales Rule,100 the Mortgage Advertising Practices
Rule,101 and the Credit Practices Rule.102
This study also classified cases based on the type of financial
product or service involved in the illegal activity. These product or
service classifications include the following categories: credit cards,
mortgage loans, student loans, automobile purchase loans, nonauto
retail finance, deposit accounts, remittances, pawn credit, payday loans
(including similar small installment loans and car title lending),
medical debt, and payment processing services.103 Finally, the study
also attempts to track the dollar amounts in total consumer redress and
civil money penalties awarded in all consent orders, final
administrative orders, or judgments imposed in every enforcement
matter.
Simple descriptive statistics were derived from each of the over
70 coded variables in order to evaluate the enforcement track record of
the new agency. All information included in this Article is a matter of
public record and is available through nonconfidential, widely
available sources. The findings and analysis provided in this Article
are the author’s estimates and opinions alone, and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the CFPB.

99. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
100. 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (2015). The Telemarketing Sales Rule implements the
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-297, 108
Stat. 1545 (1994).
101. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1014. The Mortgage Advertising Practices Rule (Regulation N)
implements Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009 § 626(a)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 5538 (2012), as amended by Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009 § 511(a), 15 U.S.C. § 5538, and as amended by Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1097, 15 U.S.C § 5538.
102. 16 C.F.R. pt. 444.
103. The study also coded legal claims to identify whether the alleged illegal activity
involved some form of debt collection practice and whether the case related to mortgage
foreclosure activity.
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IV. RESULTS
This Part presents 3 categories of results: (1) results tracking the
number of public cases and consumer relief awarded by year;
(2) results illustrating the CFPB’s enforcement processes, including
settlements, individual liability, administrative adjudication, and
intergovernmental cooperation; and (3) results classified by financial
institution, financial product or service, and consumer financial laws
enforced.

A. CFPB’s Enforcement Rollout: Announced Cases and Consumer
Relief Awarded by Year
The CFPB officially began its operations on July 21, 2011.104
However, much of the early work of the agency focused on hiring
within the complex federal process, securing physical facilities,
acquiring technological systems, and writing office policies and
procedures, as well as designing, drafting, and implementing federal
regulations on investigative procedures and administrative
adjudication.105 Moreover, the United States Senate did not confirm
the Bureau’s first Director, Richard Cordray, for nearly 2 years, leading
to some uncertainty in the Bureau’s early enforcement work.106
Nevertheless, the CFPB’s investigations and exams began to bear
fruit in public law enforcement in 2012. Figure 1 provides a graphic
representation of the number of public enforcement cases announced
by the CFPB, juxtaposed with the number of CFPB employees by year.
In 2012, the Bureau announced 8 public enforcement actions. By the
time the Senate confirmed Director Cordray on July 16, 2013,107 the
Bureau had announced 17 public enforcement cases, including 6
against large banks and 11 against nonbank financial companies. In
the calendar year 2013, the Bureau announced 27 actions. In 2014 and
2015, the Bureau announced 32 and 55 actions, respectively. Over the
104. Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Ready To Help Consumers on Day One (July 21,
2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureauready-to-help-consumers-on-day-one/.
105. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 1080.
106. Block-Lieb, supra note 49, at 42; see Deepak Gupta, Recent Development, The
Consumer Protection Bureau and the Constitution, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 945, 946 & n.1 (2013);
Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote: Judicial Review of Arbitrary Legislative Inaction, 87
S. CAL. L. REV. 1435, 1449-50 (2014).
107. Danielle Douglas, Senate Confirms Cordray To Head Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, WASH. POST (July 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/senate-confirms-consumer-watchdog-nominee-richard-cordray/2013/07/16/965d82
c2-ee2b-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html.
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first 4 years of the Bureau’s active enforcement program, the number
of public enforcement actions has roughly tracked the Bureau’s
recruitment of staff.

Figure 2 provides the total consumer relief awarded to consumers
in public enforcement actions over the first 4 years of the CFPB’s
active law enforcement program. Figure 2’s left y-axis and bar chart
numbers for total consumer relief include consumer redress, refunds,
and canceled debts awarded to consumers in millions of dollars. In the
first year of the CFPB’s active enforcement program, the Bureau’s 8
announced enforcement cases ordered financial service providers to
refund or forgive approximately $425 million on behalf of U.S.
consumers. In 2013, the Bureau’s 27 cases provided $536 million in
consumer relief. In 2014 and 2015, the Bureau’s enforcement program
began to hit its stride, facilitated by a confirmed Director, welldeveloped operating systems, and a staff nearing capacity. In 2014, the
Bureau announced 32 cases, which together produced $3.8 billion in
consumer relief. And the 55 public enforcement actions the Bureau
announced in 2015 awarded $6.4 billion in relief to consumers.
The right y-axis and plotted line within Figure 2 divides the total
consumer relief figure for each year by the number of employees
within the Bureau’s SEFL division at that time. SEFL employees share
responsibility for exams and investigations that that lead to public
enforcement actions when appropriate.108 The CFPB reports that 45%
108. Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Fiscal Year 2015,
CFPB 8 (Nov. 16, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201511_cfpb_report_fiscal-year2015.pdf. Although this study only tracks publicly announced enforcement actions, these
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of its total workforce is housed within SEFL.109 Thus, including every
attorney, examiner, manager, and all support staff, the approximately
437 SEFL employees in 2012 produced nearly $1 million in awarded
redress, refunds, and cancelled debts for U.S. consumers per employee.
By 2015, SEFL had added approximately 250 employees.110 Nevertheless, the productivity of each employee, as measured in consumer
relief, grew nearly tenfold. In 2015, CFPB employees charged with
enforcing consumer financial protection laws won almost $10 million
in relief for U.S. consumers per employee.

cases reflect the efforts of supervisory exams that uncovered violations referred to the Office
of Enforcement.
109. Id. at 13.
110. Compare id. (showing employment as of 2015), with Financial Report of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Fiscal Year 2014, CFPB 11-12 (2014), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_report_fiscal-year-2014.pdf (showing the growth in
employees).
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CFPB’s Enforcement Process: Settlement, Individual Liability,
Administrative Adjudication, and Interagency Collaboration

Analysis of the CFPB’s publicly announced enforcement actions
yields some insights into the Bureau’s enforcement process. Figure 3
presents data on the number of the Bureau’s enforcement actions that
were either contested or settled by the defendant at the time the Bureau
publicly announced the case. Much of the Bureau’s supervisory and
enforcement work takes place in the form of confidential exams and
investigations.111 Much of the Bureau’s law enforcement work is not
publicly announced. Nevertheless, public enforcement actions are
especially important because they can provide a window into the most
substantial or troubling illegal activity uncovered by the CFPB. Figure
3 classifies a case as “contested” for purposes of this study when the
Bureau had not reached a settlement with all of the defendants in the
case at the time the Bureau publicly announced the case. Contested
cases include cases in which the defendant was unable or unwilling to
settle on terms that the Bureau found acceptable, as well as a handful
of cases in which the Bureau sought an ex parte temporary restraining
order from a federal judge prior to public announcement in order to
prevent the defendant from concealing illegally obtained assets.

111. See CFPB Supervision and Examination Manual (Version 2), CFPB (Oct. 1,
2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf.
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Overall, a relatively small proportion of defendants have been
unable or unwilling to settle CFPB enforcement actions on terms that
the Bureau would accept. In the first year of the Bureau’s enforcement
work, only 2 matters included defendants who publicly contested the
Bureau’s case. Six and 11 public enforcement cases included at least
one contesting defendant in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Although the
total number of announced CFPB cases increased substantially in
2015, the number of cases with defendants who were unable or
unwilling to settle on terms acceptable to the Bureau actually declined
slightly, to 10. Altogether, only 29 cases included a defendant who
contested a public Bureau enforcement action over the course of the
Bureau’s existence, constituting about 23.8% of announced cases.
Table 1 breaks down the total number and percent of both settled
and contested public enforcement actions based on whether each case
charged an individual defendant with violating the law. The Bureau
has, on average, charged one or more individuals in nearly a third of its
public enforcement cases. Approximately 16.4% of the Bureau’s cases
charged an individual who contested after public announcement.
About 14% of the Bureau’s cases charged an individual and settled
upon announcement. The largest group of cases in this respect, about
62% of all public matters, were settled cases in which the Bureau did
not charge an individual. Although the number of individuals charged
in contested and settled cases is comparable (17 and 20, respectively),
the proportion of cases that charged individuals is much higher among
contested cases. Thus, the CFPB charged individuals in 20 out of 29
contested cases, versus 17 out of 93 settled cases. Predictably, this
suggests that defendants may be less likely to accept settlement offers
when the Bureau is determined to require that individuals pay some
portion of restitution, disgorgement, or penalties for illegal activity out
of their own pockets.
Table 1. Settlement of Public CFPB Enforcement Actions in Cases Where Individuals
Were and Were Not Charged with Illegal Activity
Contested cases

Settled cases

Total

n

%

n

%

n

%

Individual(s) charged

20

16.4

17

13.9

37

30.3

No individual(s) charged

9

7.4

76

62.3

85

69.7

Total

29

23.8

93

76.2

122

100.0

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015
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Table 2 further classifies settlement data based on what
adjudicative process the Bureau used to enforce the law. The Bureau
has the authority and discretion to bring enforcement actions either in
U.S. district court or through an administrative enforcement action
before an administrative law judge.112 Table 2 shows the number and
percent of cases that the Bureau filed in federal court versus those
filed in the CFPB’s OAA. These data show that the Bureau has
actively used both of its enforcement procedural vehicles, with about
45% of the public cases filed in federal court and 55% of the public
cases filed with the OAA. However, among cases the Bureau could
not settle, federal court was a much more likely venue. In 26 of 29
contested cases, the Bureau chose to litigate in federal court. In the
history of the Bureau, it has only brought contested public
enforcement cases as administrative enforcement actions 3 times,
which constitutes about 2% of all public matters.113
Table 2. Settlement of Public CFPB Enforcement Actions: U.S. District Courts and CFPB
Administrative Adjudication, 2012-2015
Contested cases Settled cases
Total
n
26
29
55
% of all cases
21%
24%
45%
U.S.
district
Consumer relief
$575,076,534
$2,921,329,458
$3,496,405,991
courts
Disgorgement
$$$Civ. money penalties $15,232,079
$77,559,001
$92,791,080
n
3
64
67
% of all cases
2%
52%
55%
CFPB
Consumer relief
$49,999
$7,739,677,062
$7,739,727,061
admin.
process Disgorgement
$109,188,618
$166,421
$109,355,039
Civ. money penalties $1
$294,479,001
$294,479,002
n
29
93
122
Both
% of all cases
24%
76%
100%
court
Consumer relief
$575,126,533
$10,661,006,519
$11,236,133,052
and
admin.
Disgorgement
$109,188,618
$166,421
$109,355,039
cases
Civ. money penalties $15,232,080
$372,038,002
$387,270,082
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Table 2 also includes data on the dollar amounts awarded in
consumer relief, disgorgement, and civil money penalties. These
dollar amounts include only those cases where a federal judge or
112. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
113. These cases were In re Integrity Advance, LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0029
(filed Nov. 18, 2015) (alleging TILA, EFTA, and UDAAP violations); In re PHH Corp.,
CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0002 (filed Jan. 29, 2014) (alleging RESPA kickback violations); and
In re 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002 (Dec. 2, 2013) (alleging
ILSA violations).

1082

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1057

administrative law judge issued a final order before December 31,
2015. Therefore, these numbers conservatively understate the likely
future awards that may be produced in currently disputed litigation.
With that caveat, the Bureau’s public enforcement actions pursued
through its administrative process produced a total of about $7.7
billion in consumer relief provided to U.S. consumers, which is just
over twice the $3.5 billion in consumer relief awarded through final
orders issued by U.S. district court judges. Looking only at contested
cases, however, the consumer relief awarded by federal district court
judges—$575 million—dwarfs the approximately $50,000 in
consumer relief awarded by administrative law judges in the Bureau’s
3 contested administrative enforcement actions.
Also of interest in Table 2 are data showing the proportion of
consumer relief, disgorgement, and civil money penalties awarded in
contested versus settled cases. The vast majority of consumer relief
awarded to consumers came in cases where the defendant agreed to
provide the remedy. Nearly $10.7 billion in consumer relief came out
of settled cases, as opposed to $575 million in contested cases.
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of civil money penalties, $372
million, were agreed to by defendants in settlements. In contrast, the
Bureau’s public enforcement actions generated $15 million in penalties
in the 24% of its cases that defendants contested after announcement.
Director Cordray has often spoke publicly about the CFPB’s
commitment to working collaboratively with other federal and state
regulatory and law enforcement agencies.114 The Bureau’s 4 years of
public enforcement now permits some evaluation of the Bureau’s track
record in its efforts to build cooperative bridges to other agencies.
While it is difficult to assess the qualitative nature of collaborative
relationships, Table 3 provides some information that reflects a
willingness to work with states, Native American tribal governments,
and other federal agencies. In 41 of the Bureau’s 122 public
enforcement actions, the Bureau has publicly cited some form of
cooperation with another government agency. In some cases, this
collaboration took the form of jointly filed pleadings.115 In other
matters, the Bureau cited collaboration in laying the groundwork for
114. See, e.g., Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, Prepared Remarks at the National
Association of Attorneys General (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/news
room/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-the-national-association-ofattorneys-general/.
115. See, e.g., Complaint, CFPB v. S/W Tax Loans, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00299-JB-WPL
(D.N.M. Apr. 16, 2015) (jointly filed complaint with the Navajo Nation Department of
Justice).
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the enforcement action, through the provision of expertise or
information sharing, for example.116 Some collaborative cases involved
both federal and state partners, such as the debt-collection-practices
action against JPMorgan Chase Bank, which the Bureau pursued in
partnership with the attorneys general of 47 states, the District of
Columbia, and the OCC.117 Most of the Bureau’s large cases, as
measured by total consumer relief awarded, have necessitated some
form of interagency collaboration. Cases in which the Bureau publicly
cited some form of cooperation or partnership with another agency
produced about $10.7 billion in consumer relief, constituting nearly
95% of the total relief awarded in all CFPB public enforcement
actions.
Table 3. CFPB Enforcement Actions with Publicly Announced Interagency
Collaboration, 2012-2015
Partner

Cases

Contested
cases

Cases w/
indvd.
charged

Consumer relief

n

%

Federal agency(ies)a

21

17.2

3

1

3,254,850.0

29.0

State agency(ies)b

13

10.7

3

9

2,231,001.4

19.9

Both fed. and state

6

4.9

1

1

5,175,655.7

46.1

438.0

0.0

10,661,945.2

94.9

Tribal agencyc

1

0.8

0

1

Total

41

33.6

7

12

$ x 1000

%

This includes the United States Department of Education, the Department of Justice, the Federal
Communications Commission, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the FTC, HUD, and the OCC.
a

b

This includes agencies from 49 state governments and the District of Columbia.

c

Navajo Nation Department of Justice

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

C.

CFPB’s Enforcement Outcomes: Financial Products, Consumer
Financial Laws, and Financial Institutions

Analysis of the CFPB’s publicly announced enforcement actions
yields some insights into the types of companies and financial
116. See, e.g., Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action To Obtain $120 Million in
Redress from Sprint and Verizon for Illegal Mobile Cramming (May 12, 2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-to-obtain-120-million-inredress-from-sprint-and-verizon-for-illegal-mobile-cramming/ (citing consultation with the
Federal Communications Commission and the office staff of state attorneys general).
117. See, e.g., CFPB v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:15-cv-00179-RDB (D. Md.
Feb. 4, 2015).
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products that have been subject to CFPB enforcement actions. Figure
4 breaks down the number of CFPB enforcement actions per year
based on whether the CFPB brought each case against banks or
nonbanks. Figure 4 should be interpreted bearing in mind the CFPB’s
enforcement jurisdiction. Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB enforcement
jurisdiction only over the United States’ largest banks and credit
unions—those with total assets exceeding $10 billion.118 This means
that medium- and small-sized banks and credit unions are not subject
to CFPB enforcement investigations or exams. In contrast, the
Bureau’s enforcement jurisdiction over nonbanks is not limited by the
size or assets of the company.119 A majority of the Bureau’s early cases
in 2012 were against large banks. In 2013, half of the Bureau’s 27
cases were against large banks. This proportion declined in 2014 and
eventually stabilized in 2015 at about a 25% of all matters. Over its
first 4 years, the Bureau has brought 30 cases against large banks,
accounting for about 25% of the total number of public cases.120

118. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012).
119. Id. § 5514.
120. A handful of credit unions do exceed the $10 billion threshold. However, the
Bureau did not announce any public enforcement actions against credit unions.
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Table 4 contrasts with Figure 4 by presenting total consumer
relief and civil money penalties awarded in cases against large banks
versus cases against nonbanks, both by year and overall. Using 2013
as an example, in that year, the Bureau filed a third of its cases against
banks, but perhaps reflecting the large size of these institutions,
consumer relief awarded in these matters accounted for about 90% of
all consumer relief. In contrast, the $2.8 billion in relief awarded
against nonbanks accounted for 72% of all consumer relief awarded in
2014.121 In 2015, the number of bank cases doubled, and bank matters
produced about 80% of consumer relief. Overall, while facing about a
quarter of the public enforcement cases, large banks paid about 65% of
consumer relief and 63% of civil money penalties.
Table 4. Consumer Relief and Civil Money Penalties in Public CFPB Enforcement Cases Against
Banks and Nonbanks by Year, 2012-2015
Consumer relief

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total

Banks
Nonbanks
Total
Banks
Nonbanks
Total
Banks
Nonbanks
Total
Banks
Nonbanks
Total
Banks
Nonbanks
Total

CMPs

$

%

$

%

425,000,000
100,000
425,100,000
485,800,000
50,539,465
536,339,465
1,065,300,000
2,784,071,234
3,849,371,234
5,385,059,808
1,040,262,545
6,425,322,353
7,361,159,808
3,874,973,244
11,236,133,052

100.0
0.0
100.0
90.6
9.4
100.0
27.7
72.3
100.0
83.8
16.2
100.0
65.5
34.5
100.0

46,100,000
5,000
46,105,000
47,634,000
27,366,002
75,000,002
38,700,000
23,736,076
62,436,076
109,500,000
94,229,004
203,729,004
241,934,000
145,336,082
387,270,082

100.0
0.0
100.0
63.5
36.5
100.0
62.0
38.0
100.0
53.7
46.3
100.0
62.5
37.5
100.0

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Table 5 classifies enforcement actions by selected financial
product or service. Several caveats are in order. First, not every
enforcement action is included within this selected list of financial
products or services. And, second, some enforcement actions involve
multiple classifications. Thus, for example, an enforcement action
against a bank for deceptively marketing an ancillary “add on”
insurance product in a credit card program is included in the numbers
121. Much of the nonbank consumer relief generated in 2014 came from the CFPB’s
mortgage servicing joint action with state attorneys general against Ocwen Financial
Corporation and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. See CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv02025-RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2014) (ordering the defendant to provide more than $2 billion
in relief to consumers).
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for both ancillary products and credit cards.122 Similarly, where a case
addresses illegal debt collection practices associated with a home
mortgage loan, the case is included within the figures for both
classifications. Table 5 also includes the number of cases within each
product or service category in which one or more defendants contested
the Bureau’s charges following public announcement. The percentcontested figure in Table 5 refers to the percent of contested cases
within that product or service category, rather than the percentage of
all cases contested.
With 47 cases overall, home mortgage loans were the financial
service subject to the greatest number of CFPB enforcement actions,
constituting almost 4 out of every 10 public matters. Mortgagelending-related cases generated about $2.9 billion in consumer relief,
which accounted for about 25% of the relief awarded to consumers
overall. Mortgage lending defendants publicly contested the Bureau’s
charges in about a quarter of the Bureau’s mortgage-lending-related
caseload. The Bureau charged individual defendants in 14 of 47
mortgage lending cases. Thus, cases with individual defendants
accounted for about 30% of the Bureau’s public mortgage lending
docket, which tracked the Bureau’s individual charging patterns
overall.123
The second most prevalent type of case was matters challenging
debt collection practices. Through 2015, the Bureau announced 29
cases alleging illegal debt collection practices, which produced $6.7
billion in consumer relief. Almost 60% of the relief awarded to U.S.
consumers occurred in cases alleging illegal debt collection practices.
Twenty percent of the Bureau’s contested cases involved debt
collection practices.
The third most prevalent type of public enforcement action was
cases addressing illegal credit card practices. The Bureau’s 21 public
credit card cases produced more consumer relief than cases in any
other product category—almost $7.1 billion.124 Although the CFPB
122. Correspondingly, the dollar amounts for consumer relief and civil money
penalties reflect the awards generated in cases that addressed illegal activity in each of the
listed product or service classifications. Concerning a case that involves multiple product or
service classifications, Table 4 attributes dollar amounts of relief and penalties for the same
case in both categories. For total relief awarded, see discussion supra Part IV.A.
123. See supra Table 1.
124. There is significant overlap between debt collection and credit card cases because
several matters involved collection of credit card debts. See, e.g., In re Chase Bank, USA
N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0013 (July 8, 2015) (settling allegations that Chase Bank
unfairly and deceptively sold erroneous and unenforceable credit card receivables to debt
buyers).
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brought less than half as many credit card cases as mortgage loan
cases, credit card matters led to more than double the consumer relief
produced by mortgage matters. However, credit card related cases
were particularly unlikely to involve individually charged
defendants—an individual was charged in only one case involving
credit card debt settlement services.125 And defendants in credit card
cases publicly contested the Bureau’s claims at less than half the
Bureau’s overall contested rate.126
The CFPB has announced 13 cases against companies providing
debt relief or settlement services to consumers, accounting for about
10% of the overall number of public enforcement actions. Debt
settlement providers publicly contested the Bureau’s claims in just over
60% of debt relief cases, making this group more likely than any other
to refuse the Bureau’s settlement offers. Although debt settlement
cases make up about 10% of the overall number of public enforcement
actions, they account for about 27.5% of the Bureau’s publicly
contested cases. Debt settlement matters led to about $19 million in
total consumer relief. However, debt settlement providers faced
relatively steep civil money penalties in comparison to the overall
amount of consumer relief awarded. With about $13.8 million in
penalties, debt relief services had the highest penalty-to-relief ratio—
69.4%—of any financial product or service category. Similarly,
although consumer relief awarded in debt settlement cases amounted
to only about 0.2% of the consumer relief awarded in all the Bureau’s
public cases, the civil money penalties awarded in debt settlement
cases accounted for 3.5% of all awarded penalties. The Bureau’s debt
settlement cases are also notable in that the Bureau charged at least one
individual in every publicly announced case, which is unique to debt
settlement cases.
On balance, the Bureau’s early public enforcement leaned toward
mainstream financial products commonly, but by no means
exclusively, offered to middle- and upper-middle-class consumers. For
example, although the Bureau has announced 47 mortgage lending
cases and 21 credit card matters, it has not announced any public
actions against either pawnbrokers or remittance providers. The
125. See Complaint at 6, CFPB v. Premier Consulting Grp. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-03064JLC (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014) (charging the owner of a debt settlement provider individually
for directing employees to promise deceptively to consumers that the provider would settle
unsecured credit card balances for 55% of the total outstanding obligations).
126. See supra Table 1 (noting that 23.8% of all CFPB enforcement actions were
contested upon public announcement).
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Bureau has announced 12 cases against payday and installment
lenders. However, consumer advocates are likely to view the Bureau’s
total consumer relief of $71 million in this large and controversial
market as a relatively modest success in light of the supermajority of
Americans who would prefer to adopt traditional usury limits that
would effectively prohibit most payday lending altogether.127
Reasonable observers might also query whether the CFPB has
marshalled sufficient resources in the large and troublesome student
lending market. Nevertheless, effective supervision and enforcement
in mortgage and credit card markets are surely reasonable objectives
for the Bureau, given the history of the foreclosure crisis, the scale of
these markets, and the ability to provide cost-effective relief to large
numbers of Americans.

127. Timothy E. Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Interest Rate Caps, State Legislation,
and Public Opinion: Does the Law Reflect the Public’s Desires?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115,
120-22, 127 (2014) (collecting extensive polling data and results of ballot measures and
presenting original survey results).
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Table 5. Public CFPB Enforcement Actions Relating to Selected Financial Product or
Service Markets, 2012-2015
Contested
cases

Cases

n

%

n

%

Individ. charged

Financial
product or
Service

Consumer reliefa

CMPsa

$ x 1000

$ x 1000

%

99,477.0

25.7

155,200.0

40.1

173,120.0

44.7

128,750.0

33.2

13,471.0

3.5

17,693.0

4.6

39,465.0

10.2

12,376.0

3.2

2,525.0

0.7

150.0

0.0

15,200.0

3.9

.0

0.0

%

Mortgages 47
38.5
11
23.4
14
2,913,637.2 25.9
Debt
29
23.8
6
20.7
6
6,715,728.8 59.8
collection
Credit
21
17.2
2
9.5
1
7,089,981.0 63.1
cards
Ancillary
16
13.1
0
0.0
0
2,425,061.0 21.6
products
Debt relief
13
10.7
8
61.5
13
19,412.0
0.2
services
Payday/
9.8
5
41.7
7
71,150.9
0.6
12
installment
Auto
10
8.2
1
10.0
0
172,612.9
1.5
finance
Payment
7
5.7
2
28.6
3
144,164.1
1.3
processing
Student
6
4.9
3
50.0
2
501,200.0
4.5
loans
Retail
4
3.3
0
0.0
2
95,579.1
0.9
finance
Deposit
3
2.5
0
0.0
0
62,900.0
0.6
accounts
Pawn
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
.0
0.0
loans
Remittances 0
0.0
0
0.0
0
.0
0.0
a
Attributes awarded consumer relief and civil money penalties to multiple
classifications for cases relating to more than one type of product or service.

.0
0.0
product or service

Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

A close reading of the Bureau’s complaints, notices of charges,
consent orders, and other publicly released documents permits
assessment of the Bureau’s track record in enforcing various
enumerated consumer financial laws under its jurisdiction. Table 6
provides descriptive statistics gathered from the Bureau’s public cases
that pleaded or settled claims under 6 core enumerated statutes: TILA,
FCRA, ECOA, FDCPA, EFTA, and RESPA.
The Bureau pleaded RESPA violations in 21 cases—more than
any other enumerated statute. The next most prevalent were cases
pleading TILA and FCRA claims, with 18 and 14 public actions,
respectively. Table 6 also shows which enumerated statute violations
were alleged against banks versus nonbanks. Notably, 10 of the
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Bureau’s 11 cases that alleged FDCPA violations were against
nonbanks. But 6 of the Bureau’s 8 fair lending cases brought under
ECOA were against banks.
The consumer relief and civil money penalty figures in Table 6
should be interpreted cautiously because these figures represent the
total amounts awarded in cases that included an alleged violation of
each respective enumerated statute. In analyzing cases with violations
of multiple statutes, it is generally not feasible to distinguish what
portion of the overall relief or penalty is attributable to each count. By
way of example, Table 6 shows that the 18 cases that alleged a
violation of TILA produced total consumer relief of approximately
$307 million. This is not to say that the Bureau collected $307 million
for violations of TILA, because in most of these 18 cases, TILA claims
accompanied alleged violations of other enumerated statutes or the
Bureau’s UDAAP standard.
Table 6. Public CFPB Enforcement of Selected Enumerated Consumer Financial Laws, 2012-2015
Cases
a
a
Cases against
Consumer relief
CMPs
enforcing
Law

n

%

banks

nonbanks

$ x 1000

%

$ x 1000

%

18

14.8

4

14

306,901.2

2.7

22,616.0

5.8

FCRA

14

11.5

4

10

375,130.2

3.3

65,835.0

17.0

ECOA

8

6.6

6

2

493,250.0

4.4

30,900.0

8.0

FDCPA

11

9.0

1

10

782,699.7

7.0

42,150.0

10.9

6

4.9

1

5

64,229.1

0.6

10,600.0

21

17.2

4

17

TILA

EFTA

0.9

2.7
18.2

RESPA
101,764.5
70,467.0
a
Consumer relief and civil money penalty figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included
each type of enumerated statutory claim. These total awards may be attributable in part to other claims
asserted in each case.
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Table 7 provides further information about the CFPB’s fair
lending cases. The Bureau has asserted ECOA claims 3 times in
mortgage-related matters, 3 times in auto lending cases, and twice with
respect to credit cards. Although fair lending cases in the auto finance
market have generated considerable controversy,128 these cases

128. See Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Overestimates Potential Discrimination, Documents Show, AM. BANKER (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/lawregulation/cfpb-overestimates-potential-discrimination-documents-show-1076742-1.html
(citing internal CFPB documents that demonstrate “bias” in the agency’s discriminationdetection methods).
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represent only 2.5% of the Bureau’s public docket. While the Bureau’s
8 ECOA cases accounted for about
6.6% of the Bureau’s publicly announced matters, the $493 million in
consumer relief generated in these cases amounted to 4.4% of all
consumer relief. No defendant has contested a CFPB discrimination
case after announcement. And in every case in which the Bureau
pleaded a violation of ECOA, it proceeded in collaboration with
another law enforcement or regulatory agency.
Table 7. Public CFPB Equal Credit Opportunity Act Cases, 2012-2015
Financial
product or
Service

Cases

n

% of
all

Contested cases

n

% of
ECOA

Cases w/ enf.
partner(s)

n

% of ECOA

a

Consumer relief

$ x 1000

%

Mortgages
3
2.5
0
-3
37.5
71,250.0
0.6
Credit cards
2
1.6
0
-2
25.0
300,000.0
2.7
Auto
3
2.5
0
-3
37.5
122,000.0
1.1
financing
Total
8
6.6
0
-8
100.0
493,250.0
4.4
a
Consumer relief figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included ECOA violations and
can include relief attributable to other non-ECOA claims as well.
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Much of the CFPB’s enforcement work has focused on stopping
unfair, deceptive, or abusive financial acts and practices. Table 8
provides information on cases that pleaded claims either under 1 of 3
regulations with unfairness- or deception-related provisions or under
the CFPA’s general UDAAP standards. The Bureau has used the
FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule in 11 cases, which accounts for about
9% of the Bureau’s public docket. All but 1 of these cases were against
nonbanks, and together they produced $712 million in consumer relief.
Five of the Bureau’s 47 mortgage-lending-related cases asserted
violations of the FTC’s Mortgage Advertising Practices Rule. And the
Bureau has only had 1 occasion to assert a violation of the FTC’s
Credit Practices Rule.
Deception was by far the most common legal violation asserted
in CFPB public enforcement actions to date. Bureau examinations and
investigations uncovered deceptive acts or practices leading to public
enforcement matters in 73 of the Bureau’s 122 cases. Although cases
that asserted illegal deception accounted for nearly 60% of the
Bureau’s public docket, these matters produced the overwhelming
majority of financial relief for consumers. Cases pleading deception
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generated nearly $10.5 billion in consumer relief, which constituted
about 93% of all consumer relief awarded in public Bureau actions.
There are interesting distinctions in the Bureau’s enforcement
track record for the unfairness and abusiveness standards. Cases that
pleaded deception also generally pleaded unfairness, reflecting the
simple reality that practices that deceive customers about material facts
are often likely to satisfy the elements of unfairness claims as well.
Conversely, the Bureau asserted abusiveness much more infrequently
than deception or unfairness. Only 14 cases included an abusiveness
claim, representing about 11% of the Bureau’s public matters.
Moreover, cases that did include abusiveness claims had much less at
stake financially, insofar as these cases generated about $119 million
in consumer relief—or about 1.1% of the Bureau’s overall consumer
relief awards. Cases alleging abusiveness generated a somewhat
higher proportion of civil money penalties, but these cases still only
accounted for about 4% of all penalties awarded.
Table 8. Public CFPB Enforcement Actions Pleading Unfair-, Deceptive-, or Abusive-Practices
Claims: Rules and Standards, 2012-2015
Cases
a
a
Cases against
Consumer relief
CMPs
enforcing
Law

nonbanks

n

%

banks

11

9.0

1

10

5

4.1

0

1

0.8

Unfairness

47

Deception
Abusiveness

$ x 1000

%

$ x 1000

%

711,898.2

6.3

37,421.0

9.7

5

14,892.2

0.1

6,573.0

1.7

0

1

.0

0.0

.0

0.0

38.5

12

35

10,176,456.4

90.6

210,688.0

54.4

73

59.8

19

54

10,467,098.1

93.2

253,836.0

65.5

14

11.5

0

14

118,531.5

1.1

15,553.0

4.0

FTC UDAP
Regulations
Telemarketing
Sales Rule
Mortgage Advt.
Practices Rule
Credit Practices
Rule

UDAAP
Standards

a

Consumer relief and civil money penalty figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included
UDAAP violations and can include relief attributable to other claims as well.
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

Table 9 synthesizes CFPB public enforcement data on settlement,
individual liability, and use of the abusiveness standard to contrast
public enforcement cases against banks and nonbanks. Although
CFPB cases against banks generated about 65% of all consumer relief
and 63% of civil money penalties, the Bureau has individually charged
a current bank employee in only 1 matter. No bank has ever attempted
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to contest a public CFPB enforcement action after announcement.
And all 14 cases in which the Bureau alleged abusiveness were
pursued against nonbanks.
Table 9. Settlement, Individual Accountability, and Abusive Practices in CFPB Enforcement
Actions Against Banks and Nonbanks, 2012-2015
Cases
All
Cases w/
“Abusiveness”
contested at
cases
indvd. charged
charged
filing

n

n

%

n

%

Banks
5
0
0.00
0
0.0
Nonbanks
3
2
100.0
3
100.0
2012
Total
8
2
25.0
3
37.5
Banks
9
0
0.0
0
0.0
Nonbanks
18
6
100.0
8
100.0
2013
Total
27
6
22.2
8
29.6
Banks
5
0
0.0
0
0.0
Nonbanks
27
11
100.0
12
100.0
2014
Total
32
11
34.4
12
37.5
Banks
11
0
0.0
1
7.1
Nonbanks
44
10
100.0
13
92.9
2015
Total
55
10
18.2
14
25.5
Banks
30
0
0.0
1
2.7
Nonbanks
92
29
100.0
36
97.3
Total
Total
122
29
23.8
37
30.3
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015

V.

n

%

0
0
0
0
2
2
0
4
4
0
8
8
0
14
14

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
7.4
0.0
100.0
12.5
0.0
100.0
14.5
0.0
100.0
11.5

DISCUSSION: SEVEN NOTEWORTHY FINDINGS ON THE CFPB’S
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Empirical analysis of public enforcement actions has the potential
to help inform the ongoing debate over the CFPB’s accomplishments
and challenges. In particular, this Part sets out seven findings that may
be noteworthy for policy makers, scholars, students, consumer
advocates, the financial services industry, and CFPB staff.

A. Finding 1: During the Study Period, the CFPB’s Office of
Enforcement Did Not Lose a Case
Critics of the CFPB have frequently argued that the Bureau is a
“runaway agency”129 that “continually oversteps its bounds.”130
However, this claim is in tension with the CFPB’s enforcement track
record. During the studied period, extending from the Bureau’s
inception to December 31, 2015, the Bureau did not lose any of its 122
publicly announced enforcement actions. To be sure, the agency has
lost a handful of motions, including a statute of limitations issue and a
129. Hiltzik, supra note 17 (quoting Senator Cruz).
130. Ratcliffe, supra note 21.
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venue dispute.131 And more recently—shortly before this Article went
to press, but after the period of time studied—a federal district judge
refused to enforce a Bureau civil investigative demand against a
college accreditation agency that acts as a key student lending
gatekeeper for for-profit colleges.132 Nonetheless, if the CFPB were
continually overstepping its bounds, then perhaps critics of the agency
ought to be able to point to many decisions of district court judges,
administrative law judges, or U.S. courts of appeal dismissing the
agency’s unlawful actions. Yet, from its inception through 2015, the
agency publicly announced 122 enforcement actions without losing a
single case. And after the study period, but prior to publication of this
Article, the Bureau had lost only 1 precomplaint discovery dispute.
Nor is this track record diminished by the Bureau’s option of
pursuing enforcement cases through administrative adjudication. The
CFPB has frequently used administrative enforcement actions to
conclude matters in which the defendant has agreed to a settlement.
But the Bureau has only very rarely used administrative adjudication in
contested cases. Out of 122 public enforcement cases, the Bureau has
brought only 3 relatively small administrative enforcement actions that
defendants contested after the Bureau filed notices of charges.133
Although the Bureau’s administrative enforcement procedures are
likely faster and less resource-intensive than pursuing disputed cases in
federal court, the agency has refrained from attempting to exploit
either a real or perceived “home court” advantage.
None of this is to say that the CFPB’s law enforcement efforts
cannot improve. All organizations must continually strive to develop
and refine their work. In many cases, reasonable minds can disagree
about the meaning of the law, the nature of the business practices in
question, or the appropriate process to follow. It is therefore inevitable
131. Although the CFPB has not prevailed on every claim or motion, as of December
31, 2015, the Bureau had either reached a favorable settlement or was continuing to pursue
contested matters in ongoing litigation. See, e.g., CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14cv-00292-SEB-TAB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015) (denying the defendant’s
motion to dismiss on the unfairness and abusiveness claims, but granting dismissal of the
TILA claim as time-barred); CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167-GAO, 2015 WL
5610813 (D. Mass. Sept. 23, 2015) (granting the defendant’s motion to transfer venue to the
Central District of California).
132. See CFPB v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Sch., No. 1:15-cv-01838-RJL
(D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016); see also Annie Waldman, Who’s Regulating For-Profit Schools?
Execs from For-Profit Colleges, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 26, 2016, 5:55 AM), https://
www.propublica.org/article/whos-regulating-for-profit-schools-execs-from-for-profit-colleges
(providing background on the role the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and
Schools plays in facilitating for-profit school access to student loans).
133. See cases cited supra note 113.
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that the CFPB will lose enforcement matters in the future. Indeed,
some might argue that an agency that does not lose cases may be
neglecting important and challenging problems in areas where the law
is uncertain. Either way, all large, complex organizations make
mistakes, and the CFPB will surely prove no exception. Nevertheless,
empirical analysis of the CFPB Office of Enforcement’s body of work
reveals no credible evidence that the agency has approached its law
enforcement responsibilities with anything other than professionalism
and objectivity.

B.

Finding 2: Over 90% of All Consumer Relief Was Awarded in
Cases in Which the CFPB Uncovered Evidence that Defendants
Illegally Deceived Consumers

Critics of the CFPB have suggested that the Bureau “dishes out
malicious financial policy”134 and “quibble[s] about ‘hypertechnicalities.’”135 However, the Bureau’s enforcement focus—as
measured by dollars returned to the U.S. public—has overwhelmingly
been upon companies that illegally deceived consumers. In 73 out of
122 cases, the Bureau alleged that the defendant engaged in a
deceptive act or practice. Deception was, by far, the most commonly
pleaded claim in CFPB matters. Cases including deceptive-practices
claims generated over 93% of all relief provided to U.S. consumers:
approximately $10.5 billion. Far from a novel legal theory, the federal
standard outlawing deceptive practices has been in effect since 1938136
and has not substantively changed in any meaningful respect since the
Reagan Administration.137 In every case alleging deception, the
Bureau’s examiners or enforcement attorneys found evidence showing
by a preponderance that the defendant misrepresented or omitted
material facts in a way that would deceive consumers acting
reasonably under the circumstances.
It is not malicious or

134. Lane, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Perdue).
135. Derek Diaz, Are Rumors About the Death of the 10-Factor Test for AffiliatedBusiness Arrangements Greatly Exaggerated?, CLASS-ACTION & COMPLIANCE SENTINEL
(June 7, 2015), http://www.realestateclassactions.com/2015/06/are-rumors-about-the-deathof-the-10-factor-test-for-affiliated-business-arrangements-greatly-exaggerated-2/.
136. See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111-14 (1938)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012)) (amending the FTCA to state that
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful”).
137. See In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) (including an
appended deception policy statement revising the FTC’s deception test).
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hypertechnical for the public to expect financial services companies to
refrain from deceiving their customers.

C.

Finding 3: Over 90% of All Consumer Relief Was Awarded in
Cases in Which the CFPB Collaborated with Other State or
Federal Law Enforcement Partners

Some have suggested that the CFPB is an “economic
Frankenstein monster”138 that acts as “a rogue agency”139 with an
“insular focus.”140 These claims are in tension with the Bureau’s track
record of working collaboratively with other state, federal, and tribal
law enforcement partners. Cases in which the Bureau cited the
cooperation of another law enforcement or regulatory agency
generated almost 95% of all relief provided to U.S. consumers:
approximately $10.7 billion. Moreover, in every case in which the
Bureau charged a defendant with illegal discrimination against a
protected class of consumers, the Bureau proceeded in partnership
with another law enforcement agency.141 In cases with the largest
consumer relief awards, the Bureau was especially likely to proceed
with some form of information sharing, joint pleading, or some other
form of collaborative partnership. The CFPB cited the cooperation of
at least 1 state or federal law enforcement partner in 9 out of 11 cases
with consumer relief awards in excess of $100 million. Pursuing
enforcement actions with multiple agencies in collaboration can be
resource-intensive and subject to redundant management structures.
But law enforcement partnerships can also provide an important check
on the judgment and tactics of both agencies. Empirical assessment of
the Bureau’s track record reflects a consistent institutional commitment
to investing enforcement resources in intergovernmental collaboration.
Claims that the Bureau acts in a rogue capacity or with an insular focus
should be carefully evaluated in light of the CFPB’s collaborative track
record.

138. Edward Woodson, Congress Created a Frankenstein Bureau, THEBLAZE (June 25,
2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/contributions/congress-created-a-frankensteinbureau/.
139. Lane, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Perdue).
140. Press Release, U.S. Representative Dennis A. Ross, Ross Uses Central Florida
Example for Need To Reform Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Feb. 27, 2014), http://
dennisross.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=371249.
141. See supra Table 7.
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Finding 4: No Bank Has Contested a Public CFPB Enforcement
Action

Some have criticized the CFPB for using “intimidation tactics,”142
which are “[s]ort of like showing up to a Sunday school picnic with a
12 gauge shotgun,”143 in order to “bully banks.”144 Banks are
understandably reluctant to risk the reputational harm and financial
investment needed to litigate against the U.S. government. However,
in any civil enforcement action, a defendant has the option of
presenting their defense to a judge. While litigation can be costly,
banks in general are well-funded and have access to excellent litigation
counsel and public relations staff. In particular, the banks that are
subject to CFPB enforcement jurisdiction each have over $10 billion in
assets—formidable reserves to draw upon in the face of alleged
intimidation. And yet through December of 2015, no bank has
publicly contested a CFPB enforcement case. This is not to say that
the Bureau’s settlement negotiations have always gone smoothly nor
that these settlements were produced without sharp differences of
opinion. Surely, at some point, a contested bank case is inevitable and
will present the CFPB Office of Enforcement with a difficult litigation
challenge. Nevertheless, it is an empirically demonstrable fact that in
its first 5 years, the Bureau was able to reach a negotiated settlement
agreement with every bank subject to a public enforcement action.
Arguably, an agency that does not at times bring defendants to trial
may weaken its bargaining leverage as defendants discount the
The fact that CFPB
possibility of more costly sanctions.145
enforcement attorneys have reached negotiated compromises in every

142. Katie Pavlich, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Grants Itself Authority To
Shut Down Any Business at Anytime, TOWNHALL (June 19, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://townhall.
com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2014/06/19/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-grants-itselfauthority-to-shut-down-any-business-n1853590 (quoting the U.S. Consumer Coalition).
143. Dave Clarke, U.S. Consumer Cop Says Not Bullying Banks, REUTERS (Mar. 29,
2012, 4:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/financial-regulation-cfpb-idUSL2E8ET
7XL20120329 (quoting the head of a lobbying group as stating that the CFPB practice of
assigning enforcement attorneys to supervisory exams is “sort of like showing up to a Sunday
school picnic with a 12 gauge shotgun”).
144. Newt Gingrich, CFPB Is No ‘Start-Up’ Agency, It’s the Same Old Bureaucracy
and Should Be Repealed, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://dailycaller.com/
2014/09/17/cfpb-is-no-start-up-agency-its-the-same-old-bureaucracy-and-should-be-repealed/.
145. See Wall Street Reform: Oversight of Financial Stability and Consumer and

Investor Protections: Hearing on Examining the Agencies’ Overall Implementation of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 29 (2013) (statement of Sen. Elizabeth
Warren, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).

1098

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1057

public enforcement action against a bank suggests that Bureau staff
have approached their work from a posture of reasonable compromise.

E.

Finding 5: The CFPB Has Demonstrated the Willingness and
Ability To Hold Senior Managers at Nonbank Financial
Companies Individually Liable for Their Illegal Acts

A key lesson of the financial crisis was that regulatory and
enforcement systems broke down, in part, because they allowed
individual employee compensation systems “designed in an
environment of cheap money, intense competition, and light
regulation” that “too often rewarded the quick deal, the short-term
gain—without proper consideration of long-term consequences.”146
This lack of individual accountability for reckless financial practices
“encouraged the big bet—where the payoff on the upside could be
huge and the downside limited,” from the perspective of individual
financiers.147 Taking this lesson to heart, Director Cordray has
explained: “I’ve always felt strongly that you can’t only go after
companies. Companies run through individuals, and individuals need
to know that they’re at risk when they do bad things under the umbrella
of a company.”148 In keeping with this purpose, the Bureau’s
enforcement track record shows that the agency has consistently
charged individuals with illegal activity in 25% to 37% of public cases
each year.149 Overall, 30.3% of CFPB enforcement actions charged
individuals with illegal activity.
However, nearly all of the Bureau’s cases that charged individuals
with illegal activity were brought against nonbanks. The Bureau has
charged current bank employees in only 1 RESPA matter, in which
bank loan officers accepted pay-to-play kickbacks from a title
insurance company in exchange for mortgage lending referrals.150
With the exception of RESPA, in most cases in which the Bureau
charged one or more individual defendants, the CFPB relied on the
CFPA’s interrelated definitions of a “covered person” and a “related
146. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at xix.
147. Id.
148. Emily Stephenson, U.S. Consumer Watchdog Says Committed to Stiff Penalties,
REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2013, 7:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-washington-summitcordray-idUSBRE99M1K520131023 (quoting Cordray).
149. See supra Table 9.
150. See Press Release, CFPB, CFPB and State of Maryland Take Action Against
“Pay-To-Play” Mortgage Kickback Scheme (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.
gov/newsroom/cfpb-and-state-of-maryland-take-action-against-pay-to-play-mortgage-kickbackscheme/.

2016]

AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW

1099

person.” The definition of “covered persons,” which generally
includes any company “that engages in offering or providing a
consumer financial product or service,” is the most basic provision
defining the scope of the Bureau’s enforcement authority.151 For
nonbanks, “related persons,” which include “any director, officer, or
employee charged with managerial responsibility,” are subject to the
same liability and standards of proof as “covered persons.”152 But
Dodd-Frank carves bank employees out of the definition of “related
persons,” leaving the burden of proof for bank employees less
certain.153 Without the benefit of the “related person” definition, the
Bureau would likely need to plead individual UDAAP-liability claims
against bank employees under 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(3), which requires
proof that the employee “knowingly or recklessly provide[d]
substantial assistance” to a “covered person.”154 Through 2015, the
Bureau has not imposed liability on a bank employee by demonstrating
the added mens rea requirements for substantial-assistance liability.
Thus, although the Bureau has demonstrated a commitment to holding
individuals liable for their companies’ illegal practices, the CFPB
continues to face challenges in holding individual bankers responsible
for unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.

F.

Finding 6: The CFPB Has Proceeded Cautiously in Enforcing
the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s New “Abusiveness”
Standard

Perhaps no substantive legal issue has engendered more concern
from the financial services industry than the CFPB’s legal authority to
prohibit “abusive” acts or practices. Some financial services lawyers
have urged the Bureau to use a notice-and-comment rulemaking to
define the universe of potential abusive activities. Others have gone
further, calling the abusiveness standard “dangerous”155 and asserting
that the agency’s approach “likely is not sustainable”156 and is

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012).

Id. § 5481(25).
See id.
Id. § 5536(a)(3).
Zywicki, supra note 65, at 919.

Benjamin Saul, Kyle Tayman & Andrew Kim, CFPB Must Show Its Cards on
Defining ‘Abusive,’ AM. BANKER (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/
cfpb-must-show-its-cards-on-defining-abusive-1077707-1.html.

1100

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1057

“reckless.”157 However, these allegations are in tension with several
facts that emerge through empirical analysis of all CFPB enforcement
matters. Overall, CFPB cases alleging abusive practices have
comprised a relatively small proportion of the Bureau’s public docket
as measured by the number of cases (11.5%), civil money penalties
(about 4%), and especially total consumer relief awarded (about 1%).158
Moreover, the CFPB has exercised procedural and substantive
restraint in developing the abusiveness doctrine through its administrative enforcement actions. For instance, the Bureau has never asserted
an abusiveness claim in a contested administrative proceeding. Indeed,
the Bureau has only charged defendants with abusive acts or practices
in 3 administrative enforcement actions, all of which merely used
administrative enforcement to enter negotiated consent orders settling
the Bureau’s claims by agreement.159 And although many financial
services industry lawyers have bemoaned the uncertainty of the
abusiveness standard, it is notable that every CFPB abusiveness claim
through 2015 accompanied a traditional deception claim, an unfairness
claim, or both.
Nevertheless, the strength of the abusive-practices standard lies in
the ability of the Bureau to flexibly adapt it to new and emerging
methods of taking unreasonable advantage of consumers. Nothing in
the CFPA requires the Bureau to commit this consumer protection tool
to an inflexible—and easily evaded—list of particularly enumerated
financial practices that will grow stale with time and technological
change. Claims that the CFPB is a “schoolyard bully that singles out
the quiet kid hanging out by the tire swing”160 seem overwrought when
the Bureau has never charged a single bank with any abusive act or
practice in a public enforcement action. The Bureau’s actual track
record in developing the new abusive-practices standard has been
cautiously incremental, focused on peripheral companies with highly
offensive practices, oriented toward protecting vulnerable consumers,
largely concomitant with traditional deception or unfairness claims,
157. Phil Hall, U.S. Chamber of Commerce: CFPB “Failed,” NAT’L MORTGAGE PROF.
MAG. (June 11, 2015, 3:35 PM), http://nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news/54469/uschamber-commerce-cfpb-failed.
158. See supra Table 8.
159. In all 3 cases, the defendant agreed to the settlement, and each case was
announced with a consent order. See In re Fort Knox Nat’l Co., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0008
(Apr. 20, 2015); In re Colfax Capital Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009 (July 25, 2014); In
re ACE Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (July 8, 2014).
160. Jason Kratovil, The School Yard Bully, FIN. SERVICES ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 8,
2014), http://fsroundtable.org/school-yard-bully-cfpb/. Jason Kratovil is the Vice President of
Government Affairs for the Financial Services Roundtable. Id.
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and entirely advanced through either negotiated settlements or under
the adjudication of federal judges.

G. Finding 7: In 2015 Public Enforcement Cases, CFPB Law
Enforcement Staff Generated Approximately $9.3 Million per
Employee in Refunds, Redress, and Forgiven Debts for American
Consumers
Critics of the CFPB have often complained that the agency is just
another “vast bureaucracy”161 with “bloated, overpaid”162 employees
who have “an abysmal track record in obtaining financial relief for
consumers.”163 However, empirically grounded analysis of the Bureau
and its work is in tension with these claims. While the term “vast” is
subject to some interpretation, as a factual matter, the CFPB’s SEFL
division has approximately 687 employees—a smaller group than the
average U.S. high school.164 In contrast, JPMorgan Chase Bank, the
largest bank subject to CFPB supervision and enforcement, has an
estimated 240,000 employees working in 5,511 domestic branches.165
Although the CFPB and the large banks it regulates are not
comparable in size, JPMorgan Chase Bank and CFPB employees are
similar in one respect: both workforces make roughly the same
average annual salary.166 On average, CFPB employees make
“somewhat less than a third-year investment banking analyst.”167
161. Jacobson, supra note 18 (quoting Fiorina).
162. Robert Feinberg, House Subcommittee Argues over CFPB Budget, NEWSMAX
(June 24, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/t/finance/article/511572.
163. Press Release, Lemberg Law, CFPB Ineffective in Obtaining Financial Relief for
Victims of Debt Collection Violations (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.streetinsider.com/Press+
Releases/CFPB+Ineffective+in+Obtaining+Financial+Relief+for+Victims+of+Debt+Collecti
on+Violations/10477972.html.
164. The Department of Education reports that the average U.S. high school has 854
students. Table 5. Average Student Membership Size of Regular Public Elementary and

Secondary Schools with Membership, by Instructional Level, Membership Size of Largest
and Smallest School, and State or Jurisdiction: School Year 2009-10, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/pesschools09/tables/table_05.asp (last visited May 9,
2016).
165. About Us, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/
About-JPMC/about-us.htm (last visited May 9, 2016); Insured U.S.-Chartered Commercial

Banks that Have Consolidated Assets of $300 Million or More, Ranked by Consolidated
Assets, FED. RES. (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/20151231/lrg_
bnk_lst.pdf.
166. See Matt Levine, Are Bank Regulators Overpaid?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 22,
2014, 10:53 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-22/are-bank-regulatorsoverpaid.
167. Id.; see also Kenneth Rapoza, How Much Do Wall Streeters Really Earn?,
FORBES (Mar. 13, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/03/13/how-
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Moreover, in every year of the CFPB’s operations, the Bureau
spent far less than the total funding caps authorized by Congress.168
Similar to other banking regulators, the CFPB’s budget is not drawn
directly from taxpayer funds. Instead, Dodd-Frank authorizes the
CFPB to draw funds from the Federal Reserve up to a preset funding
cap. On a quarterly basis, the Bureau sends a transfer request to the
Federal Reserve, and on the basis of that request, the Federal Reserve
transfers funds to the Bureau. Congress set the Bureau’s current
funding cap at 12% of the total operating expenses of the Federal
Reserve System.169 If the Bureau does not transfer all the funds
available to it under the funding cap, the surplus funds remain with the
Federal Reserve and, ordinarily, are eventually transferred to the
Treasury.170 Figure 5 illustrates the CFPB’s use of its available funding.
Although there are important distinctions between congressional and
CFPB spending, it nonetheless bears mentioning that unlike
Congress—which has incurred budget deficits from time to time—the
CFPB has operated with a surplus, based on its available funding cap,
in every year of operation.

much-do-wall-streeters-really-earn/#4c52f4d17f08 (listing the average pay for a Wall Street
investment analyst).
168. See Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Fiscal Year
2015, supra note 108, at 115; Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
Fiscal Year 2014, supra note 110, at 103; Financial Report of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Fiscal Year 2013, CFPB 36 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/201312_cfpb_report_financial-report.pdf.
169. Congress set the CFPB’s funding cap at 10% of the Federal Reserve System’s
operating expenses in fiscal year 2011, 11% of these expenses in fiscal year 2012, and 12%
per year thereafter, subject to annual adjustments for inflation. See Victoria McGrane,
Consumer Bureau Gets Its Money from NY Fed Account, WALL STREET J.: REAL TIME ECON.
(Feb. 15, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/02/15/consumer-bureaugets-its-money-from-ny-fed-account/?mod=WSJBlog.
170. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Announces
Reserve Bank Income and Expense Data and Transfers to the Treasury for 2015 (Jan. 11,
2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20160111a.htm (announcing
payments of $97.7 billion net income to the Treasury). Although the Federal Reserve is
required to transfer a majority of its profits to the Treasury, the Federal Reserve also funds its
own operating expenses as well as the Bureau’s operations.
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Last year, although the Bureau’s funding cap increased by $11
million, the CFPB elected to draw $49 million less from Federal
Reserve funds. Nevertheless, the CFPB’s estimated 687 SEFL
employees generated substantial refunds, redress, and forgiven debts
for U.S. consumers. As illustrated in Figure 2 supra, the CFPB
generated $6.4 billion in consumer relief last year. This amounts to
about $9.3 million in relief provided to U.S. consumers per CFPB law
enforcement employee. Put another way, every dollar spent last year
paying CFPB SEFL employees produced a fifty-threefold return in
consumer relief from illegal financial practices for U.S. consumers.171
Counting only those cases in which the defendant illegally deceived
consumers, Bureau law enforcement staff generated an estimated
$8,960,400 in consumer relief per employee last year. Thus, speaking
colloquially, for every dollar spent on CFPB law enforcement staff last
year, the U.S. government forced banks and other financial companies
to repay or forgive over $50 for deceiving American consumers.172
171. The Bureau’s 2015 fiscal report estimates $266 million in total expenditures on
salary and benefits for all CFPB staff. See Financial Report of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Fiscal Year 2015, supra note 108, at 63. SEFL employees comprise 45%
of the Bureau’s 1529 reported employees. Id. at 13. Assuming SEFL employees have
roughly the same compensation and benefits costs as other CFPB staff, the SEFL division
incurred an estimated $119,700,000 in employee costs. This estimated per-employee return
does not include other nonpay expenses such as facilities or contract support services.
172. Those public CFPB enforcement actions alleging deceptive acts or practices,
concluding in 2015, generated approximately $6.1 billion in total consumer relief. This
estimated per-employee return does not include other nonpay expenses such as facilities or
contract support services.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Congress created the CFPB to help heal the scars left by the
Great Recession and to prevent similar harm to Americans in the
future. This Article presents an empirical analysis of the Bureau’s law
enforcement track record in pursuing this mission. Drawing upon
pleadings, consent orders, settlement agreements, press releases, and
other publicly available documents, this study classified every public
enforcement action announced through 2015 based on over 70
variables. The data reported in this Article should serve as an
analytical benchmark against which future Bureau action can be
measured and as a needle to deflate the absurdly overheated political
rhetoric used to grandstand against the CFPB’s mission and
accomplishments. Vapid allegations that the new consumer protection
agency is a “Frankenstein monster,”173 based on “the Stalin model,”174
or taking the first steps toward “socialism”175 are thoughtlessly
untethered from reality. While the quantitative nature of this analysis
leaves much room for additional research and discussion, this study
suggests that the CFPB has built an effective and professional law
enforcement staff.
Among other results, this study includes the following findings:
(1) in 122 matters that generated over $11 billion in consumer redress
and forgiven debts, the CFPB did not lose a case from its inception
through 2015; (2) over 90% of all consumer relief was awarded in
CFPB cases in which the defendants illegally deceived consumers;
(3) over 90% of all consumer relief was awarded in cases in which the
CFPB collaborated with other state, tribal, or federal law enforcement
partners; (4) no bank has publicly contested a public CFPB
enforcement action; (5) the CFPB has demonstrated the willingness
and ability to hold senior managers at nonbank financial companies
individually liable for illegal acts; (6) the CFPB has proceeded
cautiously in enforcing the CFPA’s new “abusive” acts and practices
standard; and (7) in public cases challenging illegal financial practices,
concluding last year, CFPB SEFL staff generated approximately $9.3
million per employee in refunds, redress, and forgiven debts for U.S.
consumers.
Nevertheless, like all organizations, the CFPB’s law enforcement
program will continue to face ongoing challenges. For example, to
173. Woodson, supra note 138.
174. Lardner, supra note 22 (quoting Representative Duffy).
175. Jacobson, supra note 18 (quoting Fiorina).
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date, the CFPB has not announced any public enforcement actions in
the pawnshop industry or against international remittance providers
and has had relatively modest success in the market for payday loans—
all industries that profoundly affect the financial lives of lower-income
Americans. Although the Bureau has effectively pursued individual
liability in nonbank matters, the CFPB continues to face challenges in
holding individual bank employees accountable for illegal activity.
Moreover, the Bureau also faces a challenge in plotting a useful
trajectory for the new statutory prohibition of abusive acts and
practices. While the Bureau has understandably proceeded with
caution, Congress adopted this potentially innovative law in
recognition of the terrible suffering of Americans caused by defective
financial products during the Great Recession. Deploying our national
prohibition of abusive finance to serve the public welfare should
remain a top supervisory and enforcement priority for the CFPB.
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APPENDIX: PUBLIC CFPB ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST, 2011-2015
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

In re Capital One Bank, (USA) N.A., CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0001 (July 17,
2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_consent_order_0001.pdf.
In re Discover Bank, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0005 (Sept. 24, 2012), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201209_cfpb_consent_order_0005.pdf.
In re Am. Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0002 (Oct. 1,
2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012-CFPB-0002-American-ExpressCenturion-Consent-Order.pdf.
In re Am. Express Bank, FSB, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0003 (Oct. 1, 2012), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_001_Amex_Express_Bank_Cons
ent_Order.pdf.
In re Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0004
(Oct. 1, 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_001_Amex_
Express_Travel_Consent_Order.pdf.
CFPB v. Jalan, No. SACV12-02088 AG (ANx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_nlhc-tro.pdf.
CFPB v. Payday Loan Debt Sol., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-24410-JEM (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 20, 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_plds-finaljudgment.pdf.
CFPB v. Gordon, No. 2:12-cv-06147-RSWL-MRW (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.cfpbconsumerprotection-gordon.org/Content/Documents/Stipulated
%20Final%20Judgment.pdf.
CFPB v. Mortg. Guar. Ins. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-21187-DLG (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5,
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_Doc5_MGIC-FinalOrder.pdf.
CFPB v. Genworth Mortg. Ins. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-21183-JLK (S.D. Fla. Apr.
5, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_Doc5_GenworthFinal-Order.pdf.
CFPB v. United Guar. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-21189-KMW (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5,
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_Doc5_UGI-Final-Order.
pdf.
CFPB v. Radian Guar. Inc., No. 1:13-cv-21188-JAL (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_Doc5_Radian-Final-Order.pdf.
In re Taylor, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0001 (May 17, 2013), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/291305_cfpb_consent-order-0001.pdf.
CFPB v. Am. Debt Settlement Sols., Inc., No. 9:13-cv-80548-DMM (S.D.
Fla. June 6, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_final
order_adss_signed-judgment.pdf.
In re Dealers’ Fin. Servs., LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0004 (June 25,
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_consent-order-004.pdf.
CFPB v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., No. SACV13-01267 JST (JEMx) (C.D. Cal.
filed Aug. 20, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201308_cfpb_
complaint_morgan-drexen.pdf.
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0007 (Sept. 18,
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_jpmc_consent-order.pdf.
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CFPB v. Meracord LLC, No. 3:13-cv-05871-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4,
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_meracord-proposedstipulated-final-judgment-and-consent-order.pdf.
In re Wash. Fed., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0005 (Oct. 9, 2013), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_consent-order_washington-federal.pdf.
In re Mortg. Master, Inc., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0006 (Oct. 9, 2013), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_consent-order_mortgage-master.pdf.
CFPB v. Borders & Borders, PLC, No. 3:13-mc-99999 (W.D. Ky. filed Oct.
24, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_complaint_borders.
pdf.
CFPB v. Castle & Cooke Mortg., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-00684-DAK (D. Utah
Nov. 12, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_final-order_
castle-cooke.pdf.
CFPB v. Republic Mortg. Ins. Co., No. 1:13-cv-24146-JAL (S.D. Fla. Nov.
19, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_consent-order_RMIC.pdf.
In re Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0008 (Nov. 20, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2013-cfpb_0008_consent-order.pdf.
In re 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002 (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent-order_3dresorts-blue
grass.pdf.
In re GE Capital Retail Bank, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0009 (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent-order_0009.pdf.
CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167-GAO (D. Mass. filed Dec. 16, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_complaint_cashcall.pdf.
In re Ally Fin. Inc., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0010 (Dec. 19, 2013), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent-order_ally.pdf.
In re Am. Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0011 (Dec. 24,
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent_amex_centuri
on_011.pdf.
In re Am. Express Bank, FSB, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0012 (Dec. 24, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent_amex_FSB_012.pdf.
In re Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0013 (Dec.
24, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_CFPB_Consent_AETRS_
013.pdf.
CFPB v. Nat’l City Bank, No. 2:13-cv-01817-CB (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent_national-city-bank.pdf.
In re Fid. Mortg. Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0001 (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401_cfpb_consent-order_fidelity.pdf.
In re PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0002 (filed Jan. 29, 2014), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201402_cfpb_0002_notice-of-charges.pdf.
In re 1st All. Lending, LLC, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0003 (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201402_cfpb_consent-order_first-alliance.pdf.
CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-02025-RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_entered-judgment-withexhibits_ocwen.pdf.
CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00292-SEB-TAB (S.D. Ind. filed
Feb. 26, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201402_cfpb_complaint_ITT.
pdf.
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In re Bank of Am., N.A., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0004 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpb_bankofamerica_consent-order.pdf.
In re JRHBW Realty, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0005 (May 24, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201405_cfpb_consent-order_realty-south-andtitle-south.pdf.
In re Stonebridge Title Servs., Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0006 (June 12, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201406_cfpb_consent-order_stonebridge-titleservices.pdf.
In re Synchrony Bank, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0007 (June 19, 2014), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201406_cfpb_consent-order_synchrony-bank.pdf.
In re ACE Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (July 8, 2014), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_consent-order_ace-cash-express.pdf.
CFPB v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., No. 1:14-cv-02211-AT-WEJ (N.D.
Ga. filed July 14, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_
complaint_hanna.pdf.
CFPB v. Siringoringo, No. 2:14-cv-05681 (C.D. Cal. filed July 22, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_complaint_clausen-cobb.pdf.
CFPB v. Mortg. Law Grp., LLP, No. 3:14-cv-00513 (W.D. Wis. filed July 22,
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_complaint_cfpb-v-tmlget-al.pdf.
In re Colfax Capital Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009 (July 25, 2014), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_consent-order_rome-finance.pdf.
In re Amerisave Mortg. Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_amerisave.pdf.
In re USA Discounters, Ltd., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0011 (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_usa-discounters.
pdf.
In re First Inv’rs Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0012 (Aug. 19,
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_first-inves
tors.pdf.
CFPB v. Glob. Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-06643-DDP-JPR (C.D. Cal. Aug.
27, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_globalclient-solutions.pdf.
CFPB v. Moseley, No. 4:14-cv-00789-DW (W.D. Mo. filed Sept. 8, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_complaint_hydra-group.pdf.
CFPB v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-07194 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 16,
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_complaint_corinthian.pdf.
In re U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0013 (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_consent-order_us-bank.pdf.
In re Lighthouse Title, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 25, 2014), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_consent-order_lighthouse-title.pdf.
In re Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0014 (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_consent-order_flagstar.pdf.
United States v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01028-RMC (D.D.C. Sept.
30, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201406_cfpb_consent-judgement_
sun-trust.pdf.
In re Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0016 (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410_cfpb_consent-order_m-t.pdf.
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In re U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0003 (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_order-terminating-the-consentorder.pdf.
In re DriveTime Auto. Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0017 (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_consent-order_drivetime.pdf.
CFPB v. Franklin Loan Corp., No. 5:14-cv-02324-JGB-DTB (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26,
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_stipulated-final-judgmentand-order_franklin-loan.pdf.
CFPB v. Premier Consulting Grp. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-03064-JLC (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
4, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb-cfpb-v-premierconsulting-group-et-al-proposed-stipulated-final-judgment-and-order.pdf.
CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01967 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 11,
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_complaint_student-loanprocessing.pdf.
CFPB v. Freedom Stores, Inc., No. 2:14cv643 ANA/TEM (E.D. Va. Dec. 18,
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_proposed-order_freedomstores_va-nc.pdf.
CFPB v. Coll. Educ. Servs. LLC, No. 8:14-cv-03078-CEH-EAJ (M.D. Fla. Jan.
15, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_consent-order_thecollege-education-services.pdf.
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0001 (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_consent-order_jp-morganchase-bank-na.pdf.
In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0002 (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_consent-order_wells-fargobank-na.pdf.
In re Cont’l Fin. Co., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0003 (Feb. 4, 2015), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_consent-order_continental-finance.pdf.
CFPB v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:15-cv-00179-RDB (D. Md. Feb. 4,
2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_stamped-exhibit-a-jp
morgan-consent-judgment-document-3-1.pdf.
CFPB v. Union Workers Credit Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-04410-L (N.D. Tex. Feb.
10, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_proposed-stipulatedjudgement-and-order_union-workers-credit-services.pdf.
In re NewDay Fin., LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0004 (Feb. 10, 2015), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_consent-order_newday-financial.pdf.
In re Am. Preferred Lending, Inc., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0005 (Feb. 10, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_consent-order_americanpreferred-lending.pdf.
In re Flagship Fin. Grp., LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0006 (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_consent-order_flagshipfinancial-group.pdf.
CFPB v. All Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00420-JFM (D. Md. filed Feb. 12,
2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_complaint_all-financialservices.pdf.
CFPB v. Universal Debt & Payment Sols., LLC, No. 1:15-cv-0859 (N.D. Ga.
filed Mar. 26, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201504_cfpb_complaintuniversal-debt.pdf.
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CFPB v. Nat’l Corrective Grp., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00899-RDB (D. Md. Mar. 31,
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